New Outpost
In a rather unexpected move recent developments indicate NATO’s willingness to open a ‘Liaison Office’ in Japan. If that is the eventuality it will be the first ever NATO’s formal outreach beyond the European Frontier. In the history of NATO, it has undertaken active military operations in various theatres of Asia be it Iraq wars, Middle East conflicts and latest being Afghan war. By far the Asian interventions of NATO has outstripped its operations anywhere in Europe, where it has been restricted to limited intervention in the form of naval blockade of Yugoslavia in 1992, enforced No-fly zone over Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping mission in 1999.
Formed on 4th April 1949 with 12 states and with a specific mandate to ensure security of its member countries NATO continuously expanded its influence adding still larger number of allies. Post nine expansions till date with Finland as its latest entrant, NATO’s membership has swelled to almost three times of its original composition. Still there are more, likely members in waiting such as Sweden as also Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia and even Ukraine which continues to seek NATO’s membership.
NATO’s interest in Asia is not new it already has formal consultation mechanisms in place through Mediterranean Dialogue with Israel and North Africa, a unique one-on-one Individual Cooperation Program (ICP) which includes Israel, Egypt and Jordan. It initiated political consultation
with Japan in 1990 and signed a security agreement with Qatar in 2018. Though what’s new is, NATO’s willingness to focus in the Asia Pacific region, an emerging theatre of power tussle, while it is still embroiled with a major conflict at its doorstep. This may also be attributed to some purposeful prodding by US and a rush in Japan to hurriedly stich some kind of a reliable counter action plan in the event of serious dispute escalation. The scope of the proposed ‘Liaison Office’ is still unclear with some suggesting it will have NATO’s military representatives for consultations only. But for sure the accompanying optics is much larger and deeper in strategic dynamics, likely resulting in major geopolitical turbulence!
Fragile Security
Asia is already witnessing a very complicated geopolitical environment, majority of nations from West Asia, Central Asia and East Asia have been embroiled in either active conflicts or sustaining extremely fragile peace. West Asia has for long been a test bed of ‘force projection’ for Western powers, conveniently aligned with regional players having aspirations much higher than their geopolitical relevance. The result of all this has been highly damaging for the region. Central Asia on the other hand has got stuck in the balancing act of managing competing influences. The region borders Russia, China and is considered as a gateway to Europe, it also is the confluence of five former Soviet republics. It is a hotbed for transnational adventure among regional and global players. Though Central Asia keeps almost everyone interested, it still is holding back deliverables for each one of them.
NATO’s latest attempt for an almost backdoor entry in Asia is fraught with even greater complications especially considering its previous Asian endeavours. NATO’s foot on the Japanese soil will have certain immediate security consequences – US will undeniably drag NATO for increasing its role and scope from word go, a willing Japan will look to appear ever more confident in its political and diplomatic response to current disputes without any actual augmentation of capabilities, China gets a clear run to term it a ‘Devil’s Axis’ against it led by US, NATO and allies. It has already been reflected in almost weekly commentary by Chinese media since last month against such development. This will further give China an opportunity to present itself as a forced victim among the comity of Asian states, which are clearly uncomfortable with such a prospect. This will invariably give Russia also a clear signal of NATO’s agenda of confronting it from other corner as Northern Japan neighbours Russian East, forcing it to maintain sizeable forces there thereby weakening its western theatre.
While NATO can claim it is bound by Article 10 of its charter which clearly defines that NATO membership is exclusively for European countries and that its purview of operation is limited to area North of Tropic of Cancer. That makes Japan a clear non-starter as an integral NATO ally. But what if NATO assets come under attack, will NATO not get an excuse for military response? As far charter obligations restricting its operation North of Tropic of Cancer, we have already seen Afghan operation and NATO’s full-fledged participation in it. There is no need for geography lessons about Afghanistan being within NATO’s defined operational theatre. Issue of concern remains, a foot on ground brings whole lot of new equations in the operational calculus and probably Japan feels very strongly about it.
Recent visit of PM Kishida to Kiev has further stimulated this thought in Tokyo that despite having all the wherewithal for active confrontation NATO couldn’t go to Ukraine as another great power is part of the conflict. Japan seems to have reversed the equation keeping US on its soil as a guarantee for non-intervention by China and now seeking NATO’s presence as an additional insurance. Even ignoring for a while internal opposition by France and whether it has the capacity to prove its promises. Still at the face of it the implications are sobering and discomforting for other major Asian powers including India.
While NATO’s previous expansions were a matter within Europe the current Asian outreach is in an entirely different league all together. This development raises three specific questions; Firstly, why does NATO want a presence in Asia? Secondly, what makes Japan take a lead in hosting NATO? Thirdly, how will it impact an already fragile power equilibrium in the region? Issues apart the essence of NATO’s Asian pivot has visible consequences as it gradually manifests further.
Questionable Endeavour
NATO’s political and military interventions till date have at best delivered it limited success. It’s operations in Asia have mostly been under UN mandate. But it chooses to intervene despite having hefty odds underlines that political considerations have weighted heavily over sound military logics. The latest withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan was as much an embarrassment as it was demeaning. It inadvertently proved that NATO has only piggybacked United States when it entered the fray. NATO’s clear inability was evident to sustain operation of such magnitude on its own, even if it thought it must. The urgency shown towards the US dictated withdrawal timelines rather than dictating its own, had only eroded NATO’s credentials.
NATO, till recently, assumed itself as an effective counter to Russia at least in Europe. But it’s singular failure to stand on its feet and offer complete support came crashing down post Ukraine. NATO’s role was akin of a warehouse offering stocks on credit. Most surprising was NATO never displayed a clear intent for the possibility of a direct confrontation if Ukraine is harmed. In warfare it’s the capability that shapes intent and it’s the intent that defines actions. NATO failed on three major counts – own decisiveness, unambiguous response and assessment of adversary. Arecipe of ingredients for assured failure in the battlefield. NATO must give it to its adversary that it better read it’s limited capabilities and shallow political agenda which eventually would result in its weak response. That’s a clear difference between NATO and other great powers, while major powers priorities their military responses NATO functions on minimum agreed consensus and unfortunately for NATO that cannot be altered.
Geopolitical Churn
Asia is going through a geopolitical churn. The new century has seen sharp rise of China, realignment of US strategic posture towards Indo-Pacific, India’s steady growth in the region and matters of global governance, Japan discarding its age-old security outlook, North Korea approaching its military objectives faster than anticipated, Middle East trying to settle down with some home truths. Economy and security playing up closer than ever before and not the least realignment of forces post Ukraine conflict with Russia and China looking to integrate much closer than ever.
Undoubtedly, challenges in Indo Pacific and waters around China are indeed very serious. Even unilateral military and economic arm-twisting by China has been a matter of severe discontent in many Asian capitals, but stepping in of a new power block in the already complex security environment is not a comfortable thought for many. US needs to play a cautious role here, probably Pentagon feels a friendly military alliance closer on call would be great help at the time of dire needs and Japan going overboard for assured security guarantees, but it’s overall impact appears unfavourable in the region.
If US chooses to adopt a safer wait and watch approach it would result in emergence of new fault-lines, something which will be counterproductive to various other meaningful measures that have been undertaken jointly by like-minded nations and it’s valued partners. Any move towards NATO’s stated desire of an Asia pivot must be scrutinised for its security and political viability through deep consultations with major partners in the region including India. A singular approach towards this sensitive issue may end up causing more strategic damage than achieving any tactical gains!