Introduction
On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a massive, coordinated surprise attack, striking deep into Israeli territory by land, air, and sea.[1] This attack resulted in the death of over a thousand innocent Israeli civilians, with hundreds taken hostage.It marks the largest and deadliest attack in recent memory, prompting an Israeli retaliation. The sheer scale and magnitude of this dastardly attack have sent shock waves and reverberations throughout the West Asian region and the world at large. For Israelis, it evoked the haunting recollections of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 when the Arab countries, led by Egypt and followed by Syria, launched a sudden military strike against Israel, catching the nation off guard and leaving it completely surprised.
Shocking Intelligence Failure
Apart from the astounding nature of the assault, the shocking aspect lies in the total breakdown of almost all the quarters of the Israeli intelligence establishment in anticipating and thwarting the attack.This attack can aptly be labelled Israel's "Golda 2.0" moment.[2] It is imperative to underscore that the Israeli intelligence apparatus comprises not only the renowned Mossad, tasked with external intelligence, but also the domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet and the Military Intelligence Unit, known as Aman, all three having a global reputation for their ferocity, remarkable efficiency, unwavering vigilance, and formidable prowess. It is believed that the operatives from these agencies are strategically embedded in Hamas and other such outfits and thus can provide crucial human intelligence (HUMINT) whenever required. Within Israel's intricate intelligence network exists an instrumental signals intelligence unit, known popularly as Unit 8200 or "shmone matayim," operating under the auspices of its military intelligence wing. The Unit 8200is legendary for its prolific offensive and defensive clandestine cyber operations and has an extensive portfolio for conducting interceptions, code decryption, hacking and surveillance. It is considered by intelligence analysts worldwide to be the most formidable of its kind. Notably, its influential footprint is underscored by the origins of sophisticated cyber weapons, including Stuxnet, Duqu, Gauss, mini Flame, and Duqu 2.0, all intricately tied to the operations of Unit 8200.[3]
Apart from Israel's intelligence capabilities,it also has a“smart border fence” along the Gaza Strip, which was completed and made operational in 2021.[4] This metal border fence is 20 feet high and has a complex network of razor-barbed wires, cameras, remotely controlled weapons systems, radar systems, and command-control rooms to detect infiltration and prevent security breaches. An underground wall with motion sensors is also in place to deter tunnel infiltrations. On the Gaza side, access near the wall is restricted to farmers walking on foot. On the Israeli side, observation towers and sand dunes are strategically positioned to oversee potential threats and obstruct any intrusion attempts. In addition, a barrier at sea that has sensors designed to identify incursions from the water is also in place to ensure security.
Therefore, after considering all the above-mentioned capabilities and the well-acknowledged efficiency of Israeli agencies and their robust security networks, it is indeed perplexing to contemplate how a system, complemented by state-of-the-art barriers, ultimately failed to anticipate and thwart these dastardly attacks.
How did Hamas infiltrate?
What's different about this attack is its level of sophistication and coordination.Prior to this attack, Hamas had used very different tactics, focusing on mortars, kamikaze bombings, rocket attacks, and Small Arms ambushes against Israeli Defence Forces. This is a major departure from the old strategy of harassing attacks. Hamas terror operatives attacked by flying in by paragliders and by infiltrating from the Mediterranean Sea on boats and tearing down barriers to move over land. The extent of their advance was about 20-30 kilometres deep within the Israeli territory. This seems to be a classic textbook military operation where the ground offensives were preceded by a barrage of rockets fired from Gaza into the Southern cities of Israel like Ashkelon, Ashdod and others. The Hamas began its ground offensives by entering the Karem Shalom crossing, an important checkpoint between Israel and Gaza in southern Israel. Around the same time, Hamas operatives also raided and captured Israel's Erez border crossing station, targeting checkpoints that enabled Hamas to neutralise clusters of Israeli forces and spread into nearby towns with less resistance.
Although Israeli guard towers were positioned along the wall at intervals of 500 feet, they were understaffed, and the level of resistance from these towers proved inadequate to thwart the infiltration attempt. To further undermine security, Hamas utilised small drones to launch attacks on Israeli watchtowers, weapon systems, and communication infrastructure, rendering these systems ineffective in raising alarms or responding to the intrusion.[5] This calculated strategy effectively neutralised the resistance they might have encountered during their border crossing. Thus, what started as a slight penetration of the Israeli border became a wide-open corridor. With the first light of the morning on 7th October, the Israeli civilians began seeing groups of Hamas militants arrive in towns and cities near the border with Gaza, where they clashed in the streets with Israeli police and people, leaving a trail of ghastly death and destruction.
Probable Reasons for the Intelligence and Operational Failures
While the official inquiry will ultimately provide a comprehensive assessment of the intelligence and operational lapses, one should not refrain from speculating about the potential causes for such a colossal intelligence failure.
Firstly, the Israeli Defense Forces were operating under the illusion that Hamas was hesitant to initiate a full-scale conflict and were wary of a potent Israeli response that might lead to a widespread escalation throughout Gaza. Most intelligence assessments concurred that Hamas urgently needed increased financial support, particularly from Qatar, a country that had furnished Hamas with over $1 billion in aid since 2012.[6] Furthermore, Israel had permitted Gazans to work within its borders by issuing work permits, and this arrangement would be imperilled in the event of a conflict. Regrettably, all such assessments proved erroneous, culminating in this comprehensive failure. Secondly, the IDF had primarily prepared for a scenario involving a limited rocket attack, assuming that the Iron Dome system would effectively intercept and neutralise the incoming aerial threats. However, the sheer volume of thousands of rockets in the barrage overwhelmed and saturated the salvos of the Iron Dome, rendering it unable to provide adequate defence.[7] Thirdly, it seems that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) were over-reliant on their border fence and technological systems to monitor any potential Hamas actions, expecting them to either prevent or, at the very least, provide early warnings for IDF response.[8] Regrettably, this assessment fell flat, culminating in a surprise attack. Even the Israeli signals intelligence fell short in intercepting relevant information, as Hamas seemed to have out manoeuvred them. This was achieved by adopting traditional human-to-human planning methods and maintaining a high level of operational secrecy.[9] Furthermore, they meticulously avoided creating any digital or communication footprints that could have been traced. Last but not least, it's crucial to note that the presence of Israeli IDF personnel in southern Israel, bordering Gaza, was notably limited. This reduction in forces was a consequence of a significant portion of the IDF being redirected to the West Bank in response to a recent upsurge in violence between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. The recent flare-ups in the West Bank can be characterised as a significant distraction, necessitating the redeployment of Israeli forces away from the southern front, leaving the border fences along the Gaza Strip understaffed.
Conclusion
Needless to say, the magnitude of this attack and the scale of intelligence lapse indelibly will go down as the biggest debacle of all intelligence failures in the history of Israel as a nation-state. This incident serves as a valuable reminder that excessive dependence on technology without the synergy, or collaboration, between technology and human resources can never deliver optimal outcomes. The effectiveness of technology is inherently intertwined with the human expertise that operates it. This attack has dented the formidable reputation of Israeli intelligence services and, at the same time, has thrown the normalisation of diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia into a state of uncertainty for the time being. It's crucial to highlight that this intelligence failure has not only led to the tragic loss of lives but will also have far-reaching repercussions on the Israeli economy and its near-term economic endeavours. Additionally, it will exert increased pressure on its diplomatic corps, necessitating engagement at the United Nations, where Israel might face criticism in the face of its retaliation, which possibly will result in the displacement and loss of civilian lives in the Gaza Strip. To be precise, the Hamas attack has distracted Israeli attention from its diplomatic blitzkrieg, which it has been pursuing in West Asia since the Abraham Accords.
Endnotes
[1]Samia Nakhoul and Jonathan Saul, "How Hamas Duped Israel as It Planned Devastating Attack," Reuters, October 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-israel-was-duped-hamas-planned-devastating-assault-2023-10-08/.
[2]Golda Meir, Israel's Prime Minister during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, lends historical context. "Golda 2.0" denotes the striking resemblance between the recent intelligence failure and that of the Yom Kippur War, underscoring the enduring relevance of this historical perspective.
[3]S. Cordey, "Trend Analysis: The Israeli Unit 8200 – An OSINT-Based Study,"Centre for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich, 2019, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2019-12-Unit-8200.pdf.
[4] Israel announces completion of security barrier around Gaza, The Associated Press, December 7, 2021, URL: https://rb.gy/8bhjo
[5]Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, "How Israel’s Feared Security Services Failed to Stop Hamas’s Attack," The New York Times, Oct. 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-security-failure.html.
[6]Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel’s Worst Day at War," The New York Times, Oct. 7, 2023,https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/07/opinion/israel-hamas-attack-friedman.html.
[7]Ibid
[8]See note 8.
[9] Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Steven Tian and Dan Raviv, Why Hamas Tried to Sabotage Arab-Israeli Peace Prospects with a Massive Unprovoked Attack, Time Magazine, October 8, 2023, URL: https://time.com/6321671/why-hamas-sabotaged-peace-prospects-israel-attack/