The grand strategy of a state may be described as a long–term plan to accomplish its domestic and external objectives. Policies flowing from the grand strategy must aim to promote the vital interests of the nation while preventing other nations from interfering with such interests. The power that a state wields and its foreign policy orientation are important in this regard. James Rosenau, in an article in the Free Press published 1971, describes foreign policy strategy as “any pre-designed set of moves, or a series of decisions, in a competitive situation where the outcome is not governed purely by chance.”
In international politics, over 100 nation-states, each pursues interests that conflict with that of other states, in a game where rules are largely unwritten and informal, evolving mainly through the wishes of the stronger players. In a broad sense, a foreign policy strategy is a plan for advancing ones own national interests (as one defines these interests) while preventing other players from impinging on them.
Like India, China too has undergone many internal convulsions leading to break-ups. But after each such event a strong leader emerged who was able to rally the others around, by force or persuasion, and the process of coalescence started all over again.
To analyse the dynamics of contemporary international politics, it would be necessary to understand the essentials of a ‘state’, the culture of ‘strategy’, the ingredients of ‘power’ and the orientation of ‘foreign policy’. The context of this analysis would be the current status of China and India and the requirements for India to address the negative asymmetry that has developed between the two nations.
State
Both China and India are very old civilisations. Both have a long history replete with successes, surrenders and subjugations. Both have witnessed victories and defeats, unifications and break-ups, and slavery and freedom. There are many differences also between the two countries and among these, perhaps the fundamental difference has been the understanding and realisation of being a ‘state’.
The consciousness of being a ‘state’ has existed in China and the Chinese for many centuries. And they believe in the centrality of the Chinese state. Despite the fluctuations of history this belief has survived. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, during a speech in the Lok Sabha on November 25, 1959, put it thus, “from fairly early in history, they have had a sensation of greatness. They call themselves the ‘Middle Kingdom’, and it seemed natural to them that other countries should pay tribute to them. Their thinking was that the rest of the world occupied a lower grade. That has made it difficult for us to understand the working of their mind, and what is more to the point, for them to understand the working of our mind.”
A similar consciousness of being a ‘state’ has not existed in India or Indians. Here, a clear distinction must be drawn between India the civilisation and India the state. India has the essentials of a ‘state’, it has a defined territory, it has a population, a government and it has sovereignty. But India does not display the attribute of toughness where its vital interests are concerned. After the Kandahar hijack episode, India was termed variously as a ‘soft’, ‘disjointed’ and ‘directionless’ state.
Also read: Army: A Need for Introspection
China’s cohesiveness as regards language, ethnicity and culture (900 million Chinese belong to the Han grouping and speak Mandarin) is compared with India’s multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-religious status and offered as the reason for this widely differing perceptions of being a state, between the two countries. This is only partially true. Like India, China too has undergone many internal convulsions leading to break-ups. But after each such event a strong leader emerged who was able to rally the others around, by force or persuasion, and the process of coalescence started all over again.
Sun Tzus strategic principles were continuously updated by subsequent Chinese strategists over the centuries to keep them relevant to the changing technologies and environment. Kautilyas Arthshastra has become the object of historical studies.
Thus, the centripetal forces prevailed on most occasions. In India it was the opposite. On the occasions that unity was achieved, centrifugal forces came into play and the process of disintegration began. Foreign forces took advantage of the situation, played one against the other and achieved their objective of domination. Distrust became endemic, severely hampering unity or the consciousness of being a state. It is only now, in modern India, that the younger generation, unencumbered by the baggage of the past, is developing a consciousness of pan-Indian unity. Perhaps cricket, connectivity and the media are hastening the process. Technology is transcending borders and it is China that is now feeling the pressure of centrifugal forces.
Strategy
Strategy has been defined as a plan designed to achieve a particular long term aim. It is also the art of planning and directing military activity in a war or battle. Sun Tzu, of China, authored the Art of War, sometime between the 8th and 5th Century BC, three or four centuries earlier than our own Kautilya, who wrote the Arthshastra during 4th-3rd Century BC. Both wrote broadly about strategy. They discussed statecraft, diplomacy, relationship with other nations and a host of other topics in their respective books. The prevalence of ‘strategic culture’ in the two countries can be gleaned from the fact that Sun Tzu’s strategic principles were continuously updated by subsequent Chinese strategists over the centuries to keep them relevant to the changing technologies and environment. Kautilya’s Arthshastra has become the object of historical studies and no serious attempts were made, either by the military analysts or other strategists to evaluate its practical applicability and pertinence to developmental changes in India.