Spilling Own Blood on Own Land is Absence of Strategy

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By Brig Narender Kumar (Retd.) Published on January 7, 2016 11:08 am
Airforce Station Pathankot Map
Spilling Own Blood on Own Land is Absence of Strategy - © Indian Defence Review
Air Force Station - Pathankot

After having signed the Indus Water Treaty, Nehru made a forceful assertion in the Lok Sabha on 30 November 1960 that “we purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace to that extent and it is good for both countries”. The outcome of such a huge compromise was that Pakistan imposed three conventional wars and an inexorable proxy war on India. Yet India neither responded in kind nor abrogated the largesse handed over to Pakistan in the form of Indus Water treaty. We as a nation seems to forget that “those who do not respect sense of history and sense of geography do not have even the time to regret”. In spite of reversal after reversal Indian policy makers have been committing same mistake of extending olive branch to Pakistan in a hope that this time Pak will display sincerity.

...why India has chosen to fight enemy in its own territory? If it is part of strategy then I am afraid it is a fatigued and tired ideology.

Is it that we have become insensitive of allowing perpetrators to spill our blood on our soil? I am also baffled, why India has chosen to fight enemy in its own territory? If it is part of strategy then I am afraid it is a fatigued and tired ideology. In other words it is absence of strategy and lack of politico- military will to hit the enemy where it hurts most. Meek response and inability of the nation’s long arm to impose cost has made Pakistan bolder by the day because there is no fear of retribution. If India does not respond and impose cost at this stage, the attacks will intensify and re-acting under duress will have dangerous consequences.

It beats my imaginations why political hierarchy believe that Pakistan has changed? Talking to political leadership in Pakistan is something like talking to a messenger who has no voice and control over the actions of his master. It is mandatory to talk, but talk from the position of strength. The question is how do you create strength? The answer is that strength does not come from inaction or standing on a high moral ground. Strength comes only with strong response, credible capability, politico military will and ability to leverage the tools of national power. Except Mrs Gandhi no other Indian leader has ever leveraged the tools of national power to achieve larger strategic objectives. One may call it an art or ability to take calculated risk or “spirit of Leonidas” to put everything at stake for national pride. It is now time for the national leadership to take calculated risks and reverse the threat than to suffer periodically from the wounds of terrorism.

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Big Questions Need Answers

Drugs, ISI And Terrorism. There seems to be certain similarities between pre 1984 era and post 2010. The Khalistan movement in 80s was preceded by an organised drug trafficking network in Punjab. Amritsar, Khem Karan and Gurdaspur were the hub centres of drug trafficking. Drugs had brought money and weapons to Punjab and thus laid down the foundation of insurgency and terrorism that shook the nation and entire North India. Same events are being re-enacted and Punjab is slipping into turmoil and drug mafia are running their business with impunity.

Some where the drugs, ISI and terrorist organisations are connected and it will be a mistake to believe that drug cartels will remain neutral.

The flow of drugs from Pakistan to Punjab has allowed ISI of Pakistan to spread its tentacles and now it seems that weapons, terroristsand the modules if not checked will set the stage to re-start the era of terror and violence in Punjab once again.

Some where the drugs, ISI and terrorist organisations are connected and it will be a mistake to believe that drug cartels will remain neutral. They have played a role in the past and their active complicity can’t be ruled out even now. Therefore, the first question is that why the nexus between ISI, local drug mafia, even the politicians and some of the law enforcing agencies have been allowed to flourish. Will the Government rein in the drug traffickers and their masters to dismantle the network to prevent another potential turbulence?

What is the Role of Police?  No matter what the Punjab police say, the fact is that it has failed to do their job in a professional manner. As per the information in public domain, it was clear that intelligence agencies had done their job very well. The information can’t be more specific than this. If that be so why Punjab police that claims to have a very good intelligence network did not react to the information and allowed the terrorists to reach the Air Force base Pathankot. This lapse could have embarrassed the nation no end. Will the Government make Punjab Police accountable in for this lapse?

Why NSG was Employed When Local Military Authorities Were Better Suited to Conduct Operations. This was an operation that certainly would have been better executed by the local military authorities. Because it involved isolation of strategic assets, securing of vast areas and elimination of terrorists. If the reports are true, all terrorists were eliminated by the local troops and use of BMPs. What it needed was a single commander who is in control of situation.

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Will the government now nominate the local military commander responsible for handling a security challenge in his area of jurisdiction and additional resources including police will be placed under his command for the duration of the operations.

No other agency including NSG can defend military installation as well as the local military authorities. Such operations are routine for Infantry battalion and Rashtriya Rifles in J&K.

If there was any additional requirement, SF from Udhampur could have been requisitioned who are involved in such operations on daily bases in J&K. Will the Defence Minister issue guidelines that hence forth, local military commanders will be made responsible and accountable to execute counter terror operations in their areas of jurisdiction? The discretion should be with the Theatre commander to either superimposed or nominate any other officer as the commander depending upon the gravity of situation.

What is the Role of DG NSG? Robert Greene said, that a commander must elevate himself above the battlefield and his acumen as a military leader lies in his art and ability to command full range of military operations. Ironically a police officer who has never been exposed to military manoeuvres and military engagements is elevated to head a special force, not because he is qualified or most suitable but because he is a senior police officer and has to be given an appointment as DG.  DG and head of the arms are supposed to provide the conceptual and doctrinal leadership to the force they command by virtue of having practiced tactical and operational aspects in war like situations. Thus globally the military formations are headed by those who have risen in the ranks through the organisations they ultimately command. Question comes can a nation afford to have a ceremonial head with no experience and conceptual insight to supervise or direct such operations? The mere fact that he is parachuted from top to head a specialist force with no experience as a Special Forces officer, itself is a proof of bankruptcy of vision at national level. He has not even gone through the mandatory commando course or other courses that qualify an officer to be a Special Forces commander. It is indeed a mockery of the system, as a result he is not in a position to advice/ give vision to develop or train troops for future threats.Are we seeing degeneration of an elite force? Can the policy makers set this anomaly right?

Disjointed Front.The tactical commanders knew what is to be done on ground and had no doubt about the actions to be taken to handle this situation, but what was disconcerting was the strategic level leadership which spoke in different voices and created confusion by failing to nominate single lead agency and commander. The right step would have been that the local military commander should have been nominated as the commander, and all resources should have been placed under his command since he knew the geography and ground situation better than others. To some extent it sent out a message that Indian senior leadership has not learnt the art of handling crisis. Will the government now nominate the local military commander responsible for handling a security challenge in his area of jurisdiction and additional resources including police will be placed under his command for the duration of the operations.

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What are the Options to Bridge Operational Gaps?

As it appears Pakistan Army and ISI is unlikely to concede breathing space to India. Pathankot and Mazar e Sharif attack on Indian assets (one in India and another in third country) concurrently is a sign of aggressive Pakistan that is willing to take risk. Will India resort to restrain or will India build capabilities to hit back with equal force?

Why defence installations have become vulnerable is because the cantonments and garrisons have become porous, land has been encroached upon and mandatory distance from the civil inhabitation has been reduced.

Strengthen The High Value Installations. In an emerging security paradigm high value strategic targets will remain lucrative objectives. A military force can look outward only if it is in a position to create secure environment internally. Divided focus will always create scepticism and doubt in the minds of security forces. One can’t say with utmost confidence that all assets are secured as per the recommended system, however it is essential that a system approach is adopted to secure installations.Essential components of a holistic security are as recommended below:-

  • Structural Security. Structural security should be in layers so that it is able to deny access, delay access, disrupt the plan of adversary and divide their reaction. Layers must consist of impregnable concrete outer perimeter wall, electric fence to stop ingress, electronic fence to detect/ identify the breach and inner perimeter fence to pose additional delay.
  • Human Security. It must be understood that the human security is not a replacement of structural security; rather human security is an offensive tool to eliminate the threat. Human security needs to be placed at vantage point in the form of static posts but linkages between the static posts is to be provided by a mobile quick reaction teams capable of acting with speed.
  • Situational Awareness. Intelligence gives situational awareness and act as bridge between various components of the security structure. It enhances the capabilities, sharpens the reaction and reduces the response time. Most significance is that it gives a transparent environment to the security forces to thwart any attempt to breach the perimeter fence. 

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