Post-26/11, reacting to the elaborate security arrangements near Hotel Taj, Mumbai someone exclaimed with great flourish, “Why all this? Lightning does not strike at the same place twice.”
As long as it happened in the remote north-eastern states, Jammu and Kashmir, states located in so-called “Red Corridor” it was treated like a routine law and order problem.
On 7 Sep, the maxim was proved wrong. 111 days after their failed attempt to target Delhi High Court, terrorists bombed the same premises leaving 13 dead and over 80 injured. Owing to the monsoon session of the Parliament and intelligence reports regarding possible terror attack, Delhi was on ‘high alert’ when it happened. Temerity of terrorists to target same place in the capital city has shocked everyone. There is a palpable anguish among the public, who has always been at the receiving end of these terror attacks. The tragedy was no different for the politicians and officials, who reacted by blaming each other and finding lame excuses.
Common man is gripped with a sense of fear and despondency. Public transport systems, markets, business centres, courts, hospitals, hotels, multiplexes, educational institutes and religious places all have been targeted in the past. People put their lives at great risk when they frequent these places.
Due to misplaced ambivalence among the politicians terrorism has not only survived years of counter-terror operations by armed forces and police but also crept inwards from these hot spots.
India’s tryst with terrorism is very old. As long as it happened in the remote north-eastern states, Jammu and Kashmir, states located in so-called “Red Corridor” it was treated like a routine law and order problem. “There seem to be an urban-rural chasm when it comes to acknowledge the gravity of threat posed by terrorism; as long as it is fought and contained at the remote fringes of the country it is acceptable to the establishment. When it reaches cities, particularly the metros the response level shows alacrity” opines a defence and security expert. The remark is not misplaced as India is the most terror-hit country in Asia after Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The attack happened when the country’s political class was busy rousing regional passions by demanding clemency for the terrorists involved in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, attack on Indian Parliament and car bomb blast at the Youth Congress office in New Delhi. Due to such misplaced ambivalence among the politicians terrorism has not only survived years of counter-terror operations by armed forces and police but also crept inwards from these hot spots. Yet we have to get our act together.
General perception in the street about our agencies capability is far from being satisfactory. People doubt their calibre and efficiency in no uncertain terms.
26/11 was a turning point. Our security system was violated and lay exposed. We expected that a sound counter-terror strategy and capacity would emerge from the lessons learnt from the Mumbai attacks. But our coastal surveillance and defence remains porous as ever; cargo ships drift to Mumbai shores regularly, as if on ‘port of call’ mission without being noticed by navy, coast guard and coastal police. Coastal states are yet to raise and equip their coastal police force; a resolution which was taken after Mumbai attacks.
In the recent past investigations of many terror attacks have remained inconclusive. The cases have been transferred from state ATS to central agencies. The leads have gone cold leaving agencies groping in the dark. General perception in the street about our agencies’ capability is far from being satisfactory. People doubt their calibre and efficiency in no uncertain terms.
Intelligence remains our sore point. An intelligence report based on which police is put on ‘high alert’ is mostly a conjecture. A mere statement that on Republic Day or Independence Day terrorists may carry out a strike conveys nothing. When such alerts are sounded too often, even police becomes complacent. Tracking of terror groups – their leadership, modules, specialists, modus operandi, foot soldiers, supporters, sources of weapons, explosives and finance, linkages, etc. is a painstaking job. Operation Geronimo has shown that input refining needs diligence, patience and calibre. It believed that post-Batla House encounter in Delhi in Sep 2008, tracking of Indian Mujahideen and SIMI has become difficult.
It was heart warming to see NIA officials perched on a hydraulic crane scouring the scene of crime for clues.
The National Investigation Agency (NIA) cut its teeth when it was assigned the task of investigation of High Court blast from the day one – its major assignment. It was heart warming to see NIA officials perched on a hydraulic crane scouring the scene of crime for clues.
Employment of NIA to investigate the case did not go well with Delhi Police which felt marginalised as in the past it was its special cell that used to handle such terror-related incidents. Delhi Police’s inability to crack a number of terror attacks in the capital may have forced MHA to take this step.
As per the mandate NIA is supposed to take on issues concerning trans-state investigation. Its manpower has been drawn from various organisations on deputation. It has to raise its own cadre. The equipment is still being identified and procured. There is a need for having well-staffed and equipped regional offices. In cases where only one state is involved NIA is unlikely to be getting any major access due to political reasons.
There is a dearth of training facilities for the police. A constable or sub-inspector seldom returns to his/her training institute for a refresher or advanced training
As an investigative agency NIA’s role is post-incident. It lacks preventive ability. Its formation is undoubtedly inspired by Federal Bureau of Investigation of the US, which has both – investigative and proactive abilities to prevent terror attacks even if it involves attack on foreign soil. In times to come one hopes to see NIA as part of National Counter Terrorism Centre having intelligence, investigation and prevention capabilities.
Post- 7/9 the discourse has drifted to building up of counter-terror hierarchy. Setting up of Criminal Crime Tracking Network System and Counter Terror Centre is being talked about. In all this debate local police which has an important role to play has been forgotten. Unless we strengthen, equip and network country’s 13,421 police stations and 7,826 police posts our counter-terror strategy will not deliver desired results.
There have been large scale recruitments in the police and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) to make up existing deficiency in manpower and raise new units. In this rush unit and sub-unit cohesion has been affected, which is evident from the performance of units engaged in anti-Naxal operations. There is a dearth of training facilities for the police. A constable or sub-inspector seldom returns to his/her training institute for a refresher or advanced training. As per a modest estimate a policeman would have to wait for ten years to get a chance to attend a long course in training schools. In the absence of training how can a policeman keep pace with the changing time?
Control of explosives and explosive substances in India remains lax. Being an agricultural and industrialised country there is no dearth of substances which can be improvised as explosives.
Police stations are still relevant in our counter-terror matrix. Diehard policeman believe that it is the misuse of police force and neglect of police stations that has caused us dearly in terms of professional decay. “While we can collect strategic intelligence from a satellite hovering thousands of miles above us, the tactical intelligence regarding the movement of terrorists will still come from the beat constable and his mukhbir, “quips a retired ACP. He is right in saying that you cannot omit the ‘man (or woman) behind the gun’.
After any terror strike, companies dealing in security systems and equipments do brisk business, as our procurement processes are fast-tracked by easing the qualitative requirements. Most of our procurements in terms of electronic surveillance, access control, scanners, metal and explosive detectors, and bomb disposal systems have been procured through knee-jerk reactions. It is not very uncommon to find a number of foreign vendors flocking to North Block soon after a terror attack. Why cannot we do a systematic procurement through need assessment, system identification, vendor selection and smart negotiation?