Indian Defence Review

Many moons ago, from 1986-90, I was on deputation to Min of Defence in War History division and became friendly with many civil servant colleagues. In one of those conversations, I mentioned a largely held view of service officers, that the civil servants/politicians often ride roughshod over the services seniors. His considered view was different. He maintained that instead it was the service officers who got their way on contentious issues as the Generals often used the phrase ‘remember 1962, please do not blame us if things go sideways’. Reminder of 1962 disaster brought about by political/bureaucratic interference in military affairs was often a clinching argument. It is indeed true that for many years, the services got a reasonable autonomy to run their own affairs.

Much water has flowed through the Namka chu (chu means river, and this was the site of 1962 disaster). It appears that on crucial reforms like Agniveer scheme of recruitment and creation of theatre-based commands, it is the political and bureaucratic decision makers who have prevailed.

It is not an argument to challenge the doctrine of civilian supremacy. In any democracy it is the elected government that is the ultimate authority. What is being questioned are not the objectives sought to be achieved through reforms, lowering the pension bill and getting a more co-ordinated response though integration. But the means adopted to achieve those goals and the process through which these decisions have been arrived at, ought to be subjected to wider debate and proceeded incrementally rather than in one fell swoop.

Let us take the Agniveer scheme of temporary employment soldiers. This author in a joint article with Lt Gen Ashok Joshi has already dealt with some of the issues ( ref https://www.indiandefencereview.com/let-us-welcome-the-agniveer) so those points will not need be repeated. A more important question that needs to be asked, and answered, is how does this affect the morale and cohesion of the combat unit?

This author has been studying warfare for the last 40 years but has still not found an answer as to what  motivates a soldier to do his duty even at the cost of his own life. Leo Trotsky, widely regarded as the father of the Red Army had a very cynical view. He stated that a Red Army conscript advances because he faces a ‘possible’ death if he does, but a certain if he doesn’t. The Red Army was known to have machine guns placed in the rear to shoot its own soldiers if they chose not to advance. As a veteran of several actions fought as part of the Indian Army, one can vouch that this is not true of all volunteer Indian Army. Then is it only patriotism? Or is it individual and unit pride? Or is it comradeship with the brother soldier? Is the fact that the soldier knows that his family will be taken care in case of his demise a factor?

It is indeed difficult to find a precise answer. One can only surmise from history when absence of one or some of these motivating factors led to a military disaster.

Going back to the 1962 debacle, it is to be noted that the disaster was confined to just one division, the 4 Infantry Division. Indian army in Ladakh and in Walong sector of Arunachal Pradesh suffered reverses but not a disaster. The reason 4 Division melted away in 1962 in the face of the Chinese has a direct link to the unsoldierly activities like ‘Op Amar’ (building houses with troop labour), choice of leaders due to nepotism (Lt Gen BM Kaul, Nehru’s nephew) and a general deviation from the army’s primary task, i.e., the defence of the nation.

This lesson was never explicitly mentioned even in the Bhagat-Henderson Brooks report but was part of army folklore. It seems this cardinal lesson has been forgotten in pushing the Agniveer scheme. Those with an ear to ground know that even in areas where traditionally the army was the first choice, today most youth prefer police and paramilitary over soldiering.  

It appears that the Agniveer decision was taken solely on the basis of aim of reducing the pension bill (strangely, which will only become applicable after 2036 – that is when the soldiersrecruited in 2019, under the conditions of service then in vogue,will retire) with no regard to the effect on morale, motivation and efficiency of the armed forces. It appears that the model was copied from some other country with very different work culture, economic condition and strategic situation. Suffice it to say that the Agniveer scheme needs a rethink in terms of training period (minimum one year), engagement period of 7 years and post release guaranteed rehabilitation in para military or state police forces. The proportion of those slotted for retention also needs to go up from 25% to 50 %. In some sense this is a repeat of old model of ‘Colour Service’ and reservist service that was successfully in vogue till the 1970s.

Like the Agniveer scheme, the second reform that is sought to be pushed through is the creation of theatre commands in place of the current practice of service-based territorial command. The main aim of this move is to ensure greater co-ordination between the army and the air force.

This moves smacks of the ‘cut paste’ approach to import foreign concepts/ideas whole sale. Indians of my generation remember the ‘8 US$’ limit on foreign travel in the 1960s! Why 8 and not 10 or 25 etc was a question that I often asked myself.  I was shocked to find that the 8$ limit was directly borrowed from UK that had imposed it post WW II. Seemed we have still not outgrown the habit of aping the west.

The idea of this reform is obviously borrowed from the US. No two situations could be more dis similar. The US theatre commands like CentCom or Indo-Pacific are independent because there is no interconnected ness; strategic objectives are different and inter theatre transfer of resources is very difficult. Each theatre command faces different enemy. It suits the US fine since it is basically to protect the US World Empire (though unacknowledged). In case of India, the theatres sought to be made are interconnected, have the singular aim of defence of mainland and face a collusive Sino-Pak threat.  

Essentially it is meant to achieve Army-Air co-ordination that could also be achieved by less disruptive actions like co-locating the army and air command at same location, having a joint operations rooms and joint planning from the initial stages. The model army is familiar with in case of artillery of allotting a portion of resources ab initio does violence to the basic of air power and that is flexibility. A component of military power that can be quickly deployed anywhere must be held centrally and not divided.

On the other hand, there is need to re think the operations that are based on missiles being under army control as these complement counter air ops by manned aircraft. Location of Eastern Command in Kolkata and Eastern Air Command in Shillong is grotesque. Both need to shift to Brahmaputra valley. The logic stopping this has nothing to do with military efficiency but more to do with  real estate in Kolkata that army is loath to give up.

It is totally understandable that Andaman Nicobar need to be a theatre command under Navy as the task is to dominated Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean. It makes sense to put this directly under CDS but for the rest it will be better to find solutions less drastic. Integration of logistic services needs to be separated from this debate and surely needs to be implemented to save costs and end duplication. This can result in large scale saving in manpower.

This author does not claim to have all the answers to the question of how to go about bringing greater coordination between land power and air power. But theatre sation surely is NOT the solution. Let us grow up and stop aping foreign ideas and find Indian solution to Indian problems.