India’s China Syndrome

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By Kanwal Sibal Published on May 29, 2013 12:24 pm
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang Manmohan Singh
India’s China Syndrome - © Indian Defence Review
Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Li Keqiang and the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh

India-China relations are complex enough not to be seen in black and white terms. Amidst all the good reasons for India to mistrust China and deal with it as an adversary, it makes sense to work with it in areas where both can benefit. The challenge is how to craft a policy that counters the threats from China even as it allows space to build on common interests.

The Chinese have taught us a lesson in Ladakh, which we are unwilling to acknowledge as it would expose the political fragility of our China policy.

China’s growing international weight, especially economic, is increasingly impacting our interests. Being our geographic neighbour, we get pressure from it directly and through our neighbours as well. While resisting such pressure, we have to engage China too, just as the United States, which, despite being far more powerful than us, is obliged to engage with China which is challenging it strategically in Asia and beyond.

It is in this space between the need to counter China as well as engage it that the recent visit of Chinese premier Li Keqiang should be seen. Our problem is our inability to strike the optimal balance between rejecting China and reaching out to it. Our policy makers understand the nature of China’s threat and the strategic ill-will it bears us. A serious and self-defeating gap exists, however, in our comprehension of the challenge we face from China and the way we approach it.

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Ladakh face-off       

The Ladakh face-off preceding Li Keqiang’s visit demonstrated this gap. We downplayed it, explained it as a local upshot of differing perceptions of the LAC and stressed that it must not upset the calendar of high level visits and the edifice of the relationship built with considerable effort. We read from what might have been China’s script.

The core of China’s threat to us relates to our unsettled border. We realize that China prefers to leave the line of actual control (LAC) vague to keep us on the defensive and restrain us from building better defences in sensitive areas. Our belated steps, in the face of China’s persistent territorial claims, to raise new mountain divisions, improve our military infrastructure and air defences on the border are hardly compatible with the mantra of “peace and tranquility”. We need to press for clarifying the LAC but we do not.

Despite happenings in Tibet, we have implicitly recognized that China respects fundamental rights and the rule of law.

The Chinese have taught us a lesson in Ladakh, which we are unwilling to acknowledge as it would expose the political fragility of our China policy. Removing a temporary structure in the Chumar area to end the Chinese intrusion implies that we are accepting China-imposed constraints on calibrating our presence and the level of our defences in areas we claim control over. This has implications for the future. China has cowed us down with the unpredictability of its behaviour.

Despite Chinese awareness of the blow administered to bilateral ties by the Ladakh face-off, Li Keqiang brought nothing with him that could give a real impetus to a resolution of border differences.

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By merely encouraging the Special Representatives to push forward the process of negotiations and seek a framework for an agreement, pending which the two sides will maintain peace and tranquility, the joint statement repeats stock-phrases. Li Keqiang would have taken in his stride our Prime Minister’s cautionary words that “the basis for continued growth and expansion of our ties is peace and tranquility on our borders” because he knows India disregarded this admonition in reacting to the Ladakh incident to the point of doing all it could to insulate Li Keqiang’s from its fall-out.

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Joint statement

Our inadequate political strategy towards China is reflected in the way the joint statement parades convergence on a host of issues, distorting reality and conveying confusing signals to our other partners. We have been plied into projecting China which is muscling tensions on its eastern frontiers as a cooperative power that seeks positive ties with neighbours. The statement speaks loosely of India and China evolving “an effective model of friendly coexistence and common development, which can be an example for relations between big, neighboring countries”. It talks of the world needing the “common development” of both countries and the two seeing “each other as partners for mutual benefit and not as rivals or competitors”. Despite happenings in Tibet, we have implicitly recognized that China respects fundamental rights and the rule of law.

Li Keqiang’s eyes were focused on the economic agenda where redressing our trade imbalance with China is a major concern. We also need a coherent strategy to rectify the increasing political imbalance in our ties with a rising China.

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We have backed in principle a Joint Study Group on strengthening connectivity in the BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) region, overlooking our concerns about China’s efforts to gain access to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar. We have mentioned bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy “in line with our respective international commitments”, even when China violates such commitments in Pakistan’s case and opposes our NSG membership. We are acknowledging China’s commitment to promoting non-proliferation despite its nuclear transfers to Pakistan. We are ready to cooperate with China on safeguarding sea lanes of communication and freedom of navigation, ignoring China’s conduct in the South China Sea.

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We are prepared to support each other in “enhancing friendly relations with our common neighbors for mutual benefit and win-win results”, which means with Pakistan, Nepal and eventually Bhutan. We have also committed ourselves “to taking a positive view of and support each other's friendship with other countries”, endorsing by implication China’s all-weather relationship with Pakistan.

In return we have obtained virtually nothing on the boundary and trans-border river issues, our Nuclear Suppliers Group and Security Council membership, China’s disruptive policies in our neighbourhood, as well as the terrorism threat we face.

Li Keqiang’s eyes were focused on the economic agenda where redressing our trade imbalance with China is a major concern. We also need a coherent strategy to rectify the increasing political imbalance in our ties with a rising China.

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