While the Indian archives are still jealously kept by the Ministry of External Affairs (and other Indian ministries), the Chinese are slowly (and selectively) declassifying their archives.
A cable from General Zhang Jingwu, 'On Issues of Relations between China and India in Tibet' dating October 21, 1953, is one example.
During the first months of 1953, Nehru may have felt that the situation was settling down in Tibet and slowly the Tibetans were accepting the invasion of their country by the Liberation Army as a fait accompli.
A translation was recently released by Digital Archive of the Wilson Centre (International History Declassified). It belongs to the History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.
Zhang Jingwu was one of the signatories of the infamous Seventeen-Point Agreement between the People's Republic of China and a Tibetan delegation (the so-called local government of Tibet).
Later, General Zhang became the representative in Tibet of the Central Committee of the Community Party of China; in July 1951, Zhang went to Yatung (via Hong Kong) to persuade the Fourteenth Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa. During the following years, he acted as Beijing’s representative in Tibet and was designated as Secretary of the Tibet Work Committee.
A few words about the background of General Zhang’s cable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing: Nehru wanted to re-negotiate the Simla Convention (of 1914) with China, taking into accounts the new situation: Tibet was an independent nation anymore after the PLA invaded the Roof of the World in October 1950
In September 1952, before his transfer to Cairo, K.M. Panikkar, who had been ‘ambassador in Two Chinas’, had several meetings with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier. The latter told the gullible Indian ambassador that the downgrading of the Lhasa Mission was only the first step to pave the way for negotiations on ‘all outstanding problems’. The conversion of the Indian Mission into a Consulate General in Lhasa was a tragedy in itself; unfortunately Nehru had readily agreed to the Chinese ‘proposal’.
More particularly on the border question, though he generally agreed with the points made by the Secretary General, he chose to remain faithful to the Panikkar doctrine, which says ‘remain silent about the border’.
I quote here from my book: Born in Sin, the Panchsheel Agreement.
During the first months of 1953, Nehru may have felt that the situation was settling down in Tibet and slowly the Tibetans were accepting the invasion of their country by the Liberation Army as a fait accompli.
In September 1953, Nehru wrote to his Chinese counterpart that India was anxious to come to a final settlement about “pending matters so as to avoid any misunderstanding and friction at any time”. Quoting a letter sent one year earlier, he said that “No further steps have been taken since then to negotiate a settlement”.
It appears that different visitors and informants were briefing Nehru about the situation inside Tibet. It was reported that everything was quiet on the Roof of the World. In early December 1953, Nehru mentions that, he had received a letter from George Roerich, the Russian painter and scholar living in Kulu giving him more information. After admitting that “our Intelligence has looked upon them [the Roerich] with some slight suspicion although they have never had anything to get hold of,” Nehru told T.N. Kaul, the Joint Secretary in the China Desk in the Ministry of External Affairs: “His [Roerich] general report to me has been that things are very calm in Tibet and both the people and the Lama hierarchy have adjusted themselves to the new order. This is chiefly so because the Chinese have refrained from interfering in anything. The Tibetans are, therefore, not so apprehensive as they used to be.”
As we have seen in the case of food supply to the Chinese troops and the sacking of the Tibetan Prime Ministers, the report was not completely true. The Chinese had begun interfering actively in the life of the Tibetans. In fact, they started meddling in the internal affairs of Tibet almost immediately after the signature of the 17-Point Agreement.
Nehru considered that the time had come to renegotiate the old Simla Convention signed in 1914 between the British and the Tibetans. He therefore decided to take the initiative and propose negotiations to resolve ‘all outstanding issues’. The talks were to begin in December 1953 in Beijing and were scheduled to last a maximum of six weeks. Unfortunately, they would take four months to reach a conclusion. Kaul, one of the main negotiators in Beijing described the preparations for the Conference thus: “Many meetings and discussions were held and it was decided to sound the Chinese. Not unexpectedly they welcomed the idea. It was decided to send a small delegation to Peking to discuss the matter and reach an agreement, if possible. The spade work had already been done by Panikkar, [N.] Raghavan and me in Peking. The new Indian Ambassador to China, N. Raghavan, was appointed the leader and I the deputy-leader of the Indian delegation. Director, Historical Division, External Affairs Ministry, the late Dr. Gopalachari, was a member. His knowledge of history and facts of the Sino-Indian border was an asset. We were authorised to co-opt such other members of the Embassy as we found necessary. It was a small delegation, as delegations go, but convenient and closely knit.”
Nehru also believed that it was important to keep the trade marts alive as he envisioned an increase in the commercial exchanges with Tibet in the future.
Most of the correspondence or instructions during the following months was routed through Kaul, one of Nehru’s Kashmiri blue-eyed boys.
The Instructions
In early December, the Secretary General put up a Note in which he defined the main points for discussions at what became known as the Beijing Conference. The points were:
- The question of India’s frontier with Tibet,
- Indo-Tibetan trade and trade agencies,
- Freedom of movement of Indian and Tibetan traders and pilgrims,
- Passports and visas,
- Telegraph, post office and hospitals
- Security guards and escorts and
- Special position of Bhutan.
On 3 December 1953, Nehru replied to this Note giving the framework for negotiations to be held in Beijing regarding the relations between India and China and India’s interests in Tibet. He clarified the position to be adopted by the Indian delegation during the Beijing Conference. More particularly on the border question, though he generally agreed with the points made by the Secretary General, he chose to remain faithful to the Panikkar doctrine, which says ‘remain silent about the border’. Nehru wrote: “We should not raise this question. If the Chinese raise it, we should express our surprise and point out that this is a settled issue. Further, during the last two years or so, when reference was frequently made about Indo-Chinese or Indo-Tibetan problems, there has never been any reference to this frontier issue and it is surprising that this should be brought up now. Our delegation cannot discuss it.”
Though Panikkar had been transferred more than a year earlier to Cairo, Nehru was still keen to consult him on China’s affairs. The former Ambassador had suggested a step further, he had written: “if China insisted on reopening the whole issues of the frontier, the Indian delegation could walk out of the conference and break off the negotiations.” Nehru was not as extreme as Panikkar, he did not recommend walking out of the Conference, his instructions were: “We should avoid walking out unless the Chinese insist on taking up this question. If such an eventuality occurs, the matter will no doubt be referred to us.”
Zhang says that if Beijing agrees to “the absence of territorial disputes”, China would “implicitly acknowledge and legitimize India’s occupation.”
To agree to discuss the border issue was for Panikkar an admission that there was a problem. But can wishful thinking take away an issue?
Nehru also believed that it was important to keep the trade marts alive as he envisioned an increase in the commercial exchanges with Tibet in the future. He wrote: “Tibet is our natural market and we should develop it normally.” He was in favour of keeping the trade agencies functional: “Gartok is important. Yatung especially, and, to some extent, Gyantse are likely to become more important as trade between India and Tibet increases. They are on the main route. Therefore, it is eminently reasonable that we should have some trade agents there or at least at Yatung.”
In October 1953, General Zhang sent his perceptions on these questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. At that time, China was getting ready to seat for new negotiations with India.
Some points have to be noted:
- • In 1953, China still needs India, not only ‘for some international’ issues, but to supply the PLA in Tibet [see my post on the supply of Indian rice to the PLA]. It is only a year later that the Qinghai-Tibet and the Sichuan-Tibet roads will be opened rendering the PLA in Tibet non-dependent on the trade with India.
- • General Zhang speaks of China’s “insufficient understanding of imperialist privileges in Tibet”, but during the following months and years, Beijing will learn very fast; at the same time, India will be fooled in abandoning all its ‘privileges’ accrued from the Simla Convention. This is a great tragedy.
- • Zhang understood that the time was ripe to make China’s occupation ‘official’: “delaying the settlement of these issues is not good”. Beijing need to officialize its presence on the Roof of the World through a Treaty/Agreement. A few months later, the Panchsheel Agreement would be sign.
- • Zhang then brings Tawang “which is Indian according to the 1914 Simla Accord”. He says that if Beijing agrees to “the absence of territorial disputes”, China would “implicitly acknowledge and legitimize India’s occupation.” It is a fact that earlier, China has never complained about the Indian administration of Tawang and Kameng Frontier Division. It is probably in 1953 only that Beijing realized the Indian move by Major Bob Khathing and his men.