Handling Red Terror: Chicken Egg Debate

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By Lt Gen Prakash Katoch Published on April 23, 2014 1:01 am
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Handling Red Terror: Chicken Egg Debate - © Indian Defence Review

Any debate about handling the Maoist insurgency finally boils down to whether it is or isn’t a ‘Law and Order’ problem and whether it should or should not be handled by the Centre or the State. The debate has been ongoing for many years despite the Prime Minister periodically describing it as the biggest internal threat to the security of the country. And so it went at a recent confabulation at a premier training institution in the Capital. The culminating panel discussion indicated that we appear to be going in the right direction, IPS panelists focused on marvelous achievements especially in targeting prominent leadership of the Maoists, with some panelists even prophecying that the problem would over in 2-3 years provided some ‘ifs’ get addressed, which was reminiscent of Chidambaram as Home Minister declaring in year 2010 that the Maoists insurgency would be over in 2-3 years.

Large Maoist movement was reported before polls in Chhatisgarh, 16 people were killed in Bastar, Ranjangaon and Kanker in pre-poll violence.

Before the Lok Sabha elections, the Maoists reportedly offered conditional truce, the conditions being: one, accept the Maoist movement as political; two, stop attacks on leaders and activists; three, book and punish “killers” of Azad who was negotiating framework for peace in 2010; four, stop CAPF and Police “aggression” against people in rural areas under partial control of Maoists; and, five, in order to preserve Maoist leadership from conspiracies of the ruling classes  one more time in the name of talks, release all veteran comrades in prisons. The conditional truce offer was hailed as clear success by the government assessing that at the operational level, the Maoists are facing the heat with many politburo and central committee members behind bars or eliminated and saturation of the area of influence by security forces denying space for insurgent movement. More intelligent interpretation of the truce offer was that this possibly was a bid to shape the discourse with the new government that would take shape after the elections.

As expected, the Maoists renewed the call to boycott the elections. Admittedly, polling has gone through in Maoist affected areas so far despite violence and loss of life. Large Maoist movement was reported before polls in Chhatisgarh, 16 people were killed in Bastar, Ranjangaon and Kanker in pre-poll violence. Polling booths were fired upon, a returning polling party was ambushed and killed, CAPF and police personnel were injured in IED and mine blasts. EVMs were looted and poll documents set on fire at eight polling stations in Malkangiri district and no voters turned up at the booth in Silakota under Podia block.

The Hindu of 17 April 2014 reported 12.74 percent polling in Jharkhand amid violence albeit higher than 2009 which reminded one of a cricketer having gone out making six runs on six balls awarded 100 percent strike rate. We may call the overall polling rate in whole individual state and elections a success but we also need to view this success in the backdrop of deploying about 160 BSF and CRPF units to enable it. In Odisha alone, 11 additional battalions of CAPF (BSF and CRPF) had be inducted. Similar has been the case for other Maoist affected states, though exact figures are not available. Interestingly after raising scores of additional CRPF battalions, it was reported in June 2013 that the CRPF will draft 5000 troops consisting of five battalions, de-inducted from their counter-terrorism and ‘public order’ duties in J&K, their duties having been taken over by the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB).

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The conditional truce offer may be seen in light of the fact that the Maoists already know the Centre does not have the will to resolve the issue...

The conditional truce offer may be seen in light of the fact that the Maoists already know the Centre does not have the will to resolve the issue beyond using physical force, as has been demonstrated time and again both through various actions and inactions on specific issues. It is not without reason that the Maoists permit the Ramakrishna Mission to run schools inside the Dandkaranya and not by the government. Besides, truce offers have been used by insurgent organizations throughout the world for consolidation and renewing the offensive thereafter. There is no reason that the Maoists would not employ this tactics. As regards, the euphoria about eliminating and apprehending the top Maoist leadership, we only need to look west to the state of Al Qaeda despite killing of Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership being targeted by the mighty US. Admittedly, one cannot equate our Maoists with Al Qaeda but then how can you possibly ignore the foreign links of Maoists (China, Pakistan, West included) much that our government wants to look away.

The China-Pakistan collusive support in fanning the Maoists insurgency is focused on upgrading their armament and tactics plus efforts to coordinate their operations in conjunction other insurgent groups, particularly in the northeast. It is for this reason that representatives of the LeT have been attending Maoists meetings periodically. Joint training between the Maoists and PLA of Manipur has been on for some time. Not only are sophisticated arms and communication equipment being pumped in by China and Pakistan, China has also reportedly provided arms manufacturing capabilities to the Maoists. The recovery of 1.5 kg uranium IED in Assam in January 2013 is ominous. There is every possibility of China pumping in shoulder fired air defence missiles to the Maoists under garb of deniability, similar to having supplied them to Shia insurgents in Iraq, Taliban and the USWA (United State Wa Army) in Myanmar. China has even supplied helicopters fitted with air to air missiles to USWA in February-March last year despite close political, economic and military relations with Myanmar.

Eyeing Arunachal Pradesh, the cold disdain with which China treats India is indication enough that China will have no compunction to upgrade the Maoist insurgency in India’s heartland coupled with attempting grabbing more of our territory along the Himalayas. Next, what about the NGOs operating in these regions, aided and abetted by foreign powers that have their own agenda. If 55 percent of Indian NGOs authorized by MHA reportedly received 1,16,000 crores in foreign funding between 1993-2012, actual receipts would have been much higher. How much of that has been invested into Maoist affected areas and to what purpose?

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The number of the Maoists cadres would have actually expanded with inclusion of women and children though deliberately played down.

GoI may want us to believe that the Maoists are rag tag with country-made weapons plus those snatched from security forces but where are the some 40 million illegal weapons (of the 73 million worldwide) floating around in India? How many of these are in the Maoist affected region? Wasn’t the estimated annual budget of Maoists pegged at Rs 1500 crores in year 2011 with annual estimated increase of 15 percent? Finance is hardly a problem with added income from poppy growing yielding rupees one crore per acre of land particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. Guesswork of dwindling numbers of Maoists too is foolish. Maoists influence is actually expanding including in Tamil Nadu, Uttrakhand, West Bengal, Assam and even Tripura. They have firm links with the PFI (Popular Front of India) headquartered in Kerala and the Maoists of Nepal. They have established what they term ‘liberated zones’ where the state machinery has abdicated and the Maoists run ‘Jan Adalats’, awarding justice as per their own norms. These adalats are attended by thousands of villagers since the official judicial system has become defunct.

The number of the Maoists cadres would have actually expanded with inclusion of women and children though deliberately played down. In 2011, the Asian centre for Human Rights (ACHR) had reported that there are at least 3000 child soldiers in India – perhaps a conservative estimate considering that Maoists follow a policy of forcibly recruiting at least one boy from each tribal family of around 16 years of age. The fact that Maoists in the instant ambush were of 18-25 years of age indicates that the young cadre has expanded. Maoists ideology also appears to be finding support in the youth even in educational institutions like the JNU and DU, intellectual segments and have even participated in seminars and discussions in the national capital, Maoists also appear to have considerable influence on sections of the media both at the regional and national levels, not to ignore the Aam Admi Party.

So what is the responsibility of the Centre other than dishing out CAPF units and periodic generic intelligence despatches? Commomn sense would indicate that the problem is not physical action alone - eliminating Maoists. If that is agreed then what else is needed: management of social change; effective administration; providing basic amenities (potable water, electricity, medical, roads, effective PDS); education; employment; access to justice and law; all of these combined?  So if that be the case, then should not the Centre be responsible to monitor and ensure that the crores of rupees doled out specifically for the underdeveloped areas are utilised as per a specified road map? Why should the roads under the National Highway Authority of India in these areas be in such deplorable state (just like dirt tracks), without even bridges on rivulets and rivers) Why the Centre should be permitted to abdicate responsibility towards this?

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There is a crying need to give the CAPF (particularly CRPF and BSF) units their ‘own’ officers rather than posting IPS officers on deputation.

The fact remains that MHA in its present shape, despite a division to look after Maoist insurgency, is unable to cope with the problem. It is not without reason that Chidambaram had proposed a Ministry of Internal Security to be focused totally on terrorism and insurgencies including the Maoist insurgency. Ask the CAPF hierarchy and there is a constant crib that States do not know how to use their battalions and are employing them in penny packets, often on sub-unit basis. Does this also not justify much more involvement by the Centre? Isn’t this shied away because it would bring in accountability? The lack of an overall appreciation is a glaring void as is evident from the piecemeal raising and shifting of units and the BSF openly saying they have been diverted from their primary job.

Then is the poor leadership, which is vehemently objected to by the IPS lobby. The fact remains that time and again the CRPF has suffered losses by repeating the same mistakes over and over again through the years. With claims of improved pre-induction training, the obvious lacunae is the poor leadership (lack of leading from the front) and the practice of placing IPS officers (attuned to handling law and order) in charge of CPF units deployed in counter insurgency areas. The officer-man mix in CI operations is vital.

There is a crying need to give the CAPF (particularly CRPF and BSF) units their ‘own’ officers rather than posting IPS officers on deputation. The Dantewada massacre of 76 CRPF personnel was courtesy the stupid order of a new SP posted at Raipur from the IPS who obviously had no idea of ground realities of CI in the said region. Then is the need for restructuring of the CAPF units, particularly the CRPF. Why the performance of BSF units is better than the CRPF is because the BSF has been modelled somewhat on the lines of the Army. The Maoist insurgency is going to continue for considerable number of years and the best bet would be to restructure the CRPF units on lines of the Rashtriya Rifles rather than continuing needless debate over the regional versus national face of the force, that has blockade reorganization altogether. Concurrent to this is the need to transform the NDRF from a generalist to a specialized force.

The bottom line is that while we may continue with the chicken versus egg debate but unless the above issues are resolved let us not fool the nation by saying that the problem will be over in next 2-3 years.

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