Mr. Modi has indeed commenced his unprecedented third term as Prime Minister with quite a bang, though not the kind he would have either anticipated or wanted. As his government gets going, it has much on its plate. Its first order of business, has to be about tackling the spate of terrorist attacks that have occurred South of the Pir Panjal Range, in the proximity of Jammu, resulting in casualties to innocent civilians and SF personnel, both fatal and non-fatal. While the situation is of some concern and, of necessity, be handled with speed and firmness, it is also equally important that we not over-react and respond with excessive force. We must also not be misled by the terms and phrases being bandied about on mainstream media by politicians, journalists and commentators. Misunderstanding semantics can easily lead to misperceptions and drawing incorrect conclusions.
At the outset, we need to be clear that the insurgency that affected Jammu and Kashmir from the early 1990’s to the mid 2000’s, has played itself out, especially after Article 370 was nullified. With increasing tourism and an economic boom on the horizon, the average local no longer sees any gains in supporting violence to achieve their professional, socio-economic or political aspirations. This was reflected in the relatively high voter turnout seen for the recently concluded General Elections. Terror groups, therefore, no longer find favour, resulting in their numbers greatly depleted and operational capabilities being diminished. In addition, they are increasingly perceived as motivated by selfish commercial considerations rather than ideology, and are therefore seen more as troublemakers and bandits rather than soldiers fighting for Azadi. For all intents and purposes, these groups no longer pose a serious threat and tackling them is well within the capabilities of the State Police assisted by the CAPF.
It may well appear counter intuitive, but in the prevailing circumstances it is essential that AFSPA be removed from the hinterland and the Army, especially the Rashtriya Rifles, be moved out and redeployed on the LOC to strengthen the counter-infiltration grid. It goes without saying, many within the security establishment will oppose such a move on grounds that it will leave our lines of communication and the SF vulnerable to attacks and point to these latest terrorist strikes to reinforce their argument. What is not considered is that the very premise they have based their arguments on are no longer relevant and hence inconsequential.
Fact of the matter is that over the past decade or so Jammu and Kashmir no longer faces an insurgency, but a problem of terrorism. There is a subtle difference between both and each requires different strategies and tactics to counter them. An insurgency, by definition, is a popular people’s movement that uses force against the government in power to achieve its political ends. On occasion it may well resort to the use of terror tactics to delegitimise and discredit the government.
Terrorists, on the other hand, whatever be their ideology, use violence to sow fear among the local civilian population to gain political, economic or religious power. They neither require support nor care about the impact their actions may have on the local population. Embedded sleeper agents or a few sympathisers are sufficient for providing the requisite logistic support. Most importantly, the administrative and governance systems continue to function, though their credibility and efficacy may be questioned.
Thus, counter insurgency operations involve pacification of towns and villages, area domination and assistance in re-establishing local administrative, judicial and police machinery to get government functioning effectively once again. All of this requires the establishment of a counter-insurgency grid which implies a heavy deployment of forces on the ground. Counter terror operations on the other hand, are purely search and destroy missions best carried with the large-scale deployment of intelligence assets to locate the targets, and Special Forces elements with the appropriate support, that then go in and destroy them. Such actions need not only be restricted to neutralise the terrorists but also their bases as well.
The manner in which these terror strikes have been carried out suggests a high level of planning and coordination along with the availability of accurate intelligence inputs, probably from human intelligence sources in the vicinity. The fact that these terrorists were able to infiltrate undetected and have also performed quite well when challenged suggests a high level of training and leadership, which leads one to conclude they may include or well be former Army or Special Forces personnel. Whether the infiltration was through the LOC or the International Boundary remains a matter of speculation, requires examination and calls for greater focus on strengthening counter-infiltration measures.
So why has Pakistan decided on this course of action South of the Pir Panjal at a time when the ceasefire is in place along the LOC and it faces a rather difficult and fragile socio-economic situation within the country, what with Baluchistan and POK in flames? One obvious reason could be to divert attention from the problems within, as has been previously attempted on numerous occasions. What is certainly very different from earlier is that the Army has a very tenuous hold over the political establishment and is unpopular with large sections of the population. Moreover, the Generals have been publicly exposed over indulging in humungous levels of corruption and find themselves in a confrontation with the Supreme Court.
It is also quite likely that they have not taken too kindly to public statements by senior politicians of the BJP of their desire to liberate POK in this Government’s new term. Understandably, tensions with China have gone up a notch, following the government’s overtures to Taiwan and the decision to rename cities in Tibet. Clearly with the focus of our military on the PLA and the LAC, the Pakistani leadership may well see this as an ideal opportunity to poke us in the eye at a time when elections in the Union Territory are being contemplated. What would be most worrying is if this is being undertaken at the instigation of, and in connivance with, of China. A deterioration in the internal situation in Jammu and Kashmir will force us to either reinforce the SF deployed there by redeploying troops committed in Ladakh or from those located in peace areas whose operational deployments are on the LAC. Any redeployment of forces would obviously be to the PLA’s advantage.
As to their reasons for selecting the vicinity of Jammu for the spate of terror strikes is not difficult to unravel. Since pacification of this sector by the middle of the last decade, the area has remained reasonably peaceful, barring the odd incident. Thus, most of the forces then deployed there were shifted to the Kashmir Valley to strengthen the counter insurgency grid. This resulted in voids that Pakistan has now cleverly exploited. Incidentally, as the insurgency diminished in the Kashmir Valley, these units were hurriedly deployed in Eastern Ladakh along the LAC following the confrontation with China.
So where are these terrorists and how exactly should our counter terror operations to neutralise them proceed? Based on information publicly available, the terrorists appear to have had two courses of action available to them. They may have either exfiltrated back to Pakistan or dispersed into smaller elements and moved into hideouts in the jungles and upper reaches of the Pir Panjal mountains. Suggestions, as the one made by Mr. A S Dulat, former RAW Chief, that they have been inducted in strength, and number around 80-100 seem grossly exaggerated. The quantum of logistic support required by them would be humungous and beyond the capability of their supporters to provide undetected.
In the circumstances, there are a number of defensive measures we should have initiated by now. Firstly, the counter-infiltration grid along the LOC and IB should have been quickly enhanced. Similarly, the security of key vulnerable points, such as temples in the area and the route to be followed by pilgrims participating in the Amarnath Yatra, would need to be substantially enhanced. Thirdly, elements from troops deployed in the Kashmir Valley must be moved forward and deployed along the heights of the Pir Panjal to prevent the terrorists from entering into the valley. It has been suggested by some analysts and commentators that additional forces be inducted to saturate the sector and carry out area domination.
As has been stated earlier this is not only an inefficient way to conduct counter terror operations, but would also be playing into the hands of the Chinese. Instead, we should rapidly scale up aerial surveillance, technical and human intelligence resources in the sector and use our Special Forces elements already deployed to undertake strikes based on specific actionable intelligence. In addition, some of these elements could also be inserted to establish ambushes and blocks in areas where it is suspected the terrorists may be lying low in.
For all intents and purposes Pakistan has morphed from being a supporter of a cross-border insurgency into a full-fledged terrorist state. The terror groups manned by their citizens and supported by the state have the capability undertake missions to target us, be it in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere, like the earlier attack in Mumbai. They are no different from Gaddafi’s Libya and the must be called out by the international community to face the consequences for their actions.