China and Bhutan held their 10th round of expert group meeting (EGM) on boundary issues in Kunming (China) between April 6 and 9. This was reportedly the 25th round of boundary talks between the two countries that began 37 years ago in 1984. This round was the first one since the Doklam standoff in 2017 and after China made fresh illegal claims to Bhutan’s 605 sq km Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary in June 2020. Mao Zhedong had said, “Tibet is the palm of China and Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) are its fingers.” That set off China’s annexation and occupation of Tibet, cross-Himalayan plunder and continuing illegal claims.
But in the case of Doklam Plateau of Bhutan, the worshippers of Sun Tzu never realized its value because they were busy eyeing major chunks of Indian Territories as pieces of cake. That is why China laid claims to the Doklam Plateau only in the 1990s. It may be recalled that China had only claimed Tawang in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh on grounds that Tibetans visited the ancient Tawang monastery. But in 2005 China suddenly expanded this claim to entire Arunachal Pradesh calling it South Tibet.
According to China’s foreign ministry, it was agreed to maintain cordial relations at the border and a roadmap for speeding up China-Bhutan border negotiations was also discussed at the 10th EGM meeting between the two countries - same jargon that is used in India-China boundary talks, which means nothing to China and sugar-coats the evil designs of China’s Communist Party (CCP). Over the years, China has kept on expanding her claims in the central sector of Bhutan in successive meetings. Once China claimed the Doklam Plateau, it resorted to frequent PLA patrols coming to the post of Royal Bhutan Army (RBA), spending some time there and declaring that the plateau is Chinese property. This went on for some years but was not reported in Bhutan’s or Indian media. India had the chance of proposing a joint India-Bhutan venture on Doklam especially since the plateau is the property of the King of Bhutan, not government property. However, Indian diplomats preferred to sit on the fence.
China’s ‘Legal Warfare’ is about ‘manufacturing history’ to support its illegal territorial claims. In late 1990s, China told Bhutan what it claimed to be 'evidence', asserting its ownership of disputed tracts of land in Doklam region. What led to the 73-day standoff between PLA and Indian Army (IA) in 2017 in Bhutan over construction of a road by China in Doklam near the India-China-Bhutan Trijunction border is well documented. China had an agreement with Bhutan in 1998 not to alter the status quo of the China-Bhutan boundary, pending its final resolution. But China did the opposite violating the agreement by design. Bhutan had to convey to China that its road construction was not keeping with the agreements between the two countries. But agreements and treaties whether bilateral, multilateral or international are like toilet paper to Beijing once it sets its sights on a piece of foreign territory. China also released a map showing the Doklam Plateau part of Chinese territory.
At the 10th EGM, China and Bhutan perhaps discussed the 269 sq km Bhutanese territory claimed by China in North West Bhutan including 89 sq km of Doklam, 42 sq km of Sinchulumpa, 138 Sq km of Shakhatoe, and; 495 sq km in Central Bhutan. Chinese claim to the Sakteng Wildlife Sancturay and subsequent claims in the offing may have been left by China to a subsequent EGM.The Doklam Plateau is strategically significant as it is proximate to the Siliguri corridor – the narrow bridge to India’s northeast. Occupation of Doklam Plateau by PLA will turn the flanks of Indian defences in Sikkim and endanger the Siliguri corridor. In the boundary talks with Bhutan, China has been offering land to Bhutan in the north in exchange of giving up the Doklam Plateau.
In 2017, the ‘disengagement’ from the Doklam standoff between the PLA and IA was peaceful but amounted to only pullback of the IA. The PLA firmed in at its holding line and reinforced its positions in North Doklam with new defence works. This too was not mentioned in Bhutanese and Indian media. Speaking to the media in June 2019, Prime Minister Lotay Tshering of Bhutan called upon China to maintain status quo in the Doklam region, saying “no side” should do anything “unilaterally” near the tri-junction point between India, China and Bhutan. However, this may be wishful thinking given the rogue mentality of China. China perhaps is also emboldened denying India disengagement in Eastern Ladakh beyond that affecred in Pangong Tso area.
In December 2020, satellite footage emerged in media of PLA having constructed a village in the Doklam Plateau area along with a new road leading to it. The author of the article also revealed that other areas of Western Bhutan have also been gradually encroached upon by China to secure access to the border with India. Bhutan denied the village is on its territory but that denial perhaps was more of a political statement. As China illegally occupies Aksai Chin in Ladakh and enclaves of Minsar (Men ser) near Lake Mansarovar used by Indian pilgrims of all communities to visit Mount Kailash, it is also in illegal occupation of Bhutanese enclave of Tconsists of Darchen (Dar chen) and Labrang again used by Bhutan and Indian nationals for periodic pilgrimages.
China can be expected to apply all round pressure on Bhutan to realize its illegal claims, especially the Doklam Plateau. The Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary recently claimed by China has no access from China occupied Tibet but China perhaps plans to build a road to it after capturing a portion of Arunachal Pradesh. While China can be expected to use conventional and sub-conventional force against Bhutan, it will continue to exert diplomatic, economic and psychological pressures on Thimpu.
The Sydney-bases Lowy Institute ranked China number one in the world in the 2019 Global Diplomatic Index followed by the US and France. Bhutan’s Consulate in Hong Kong before Hong Kong came under Beijing continues to run. This provides a diplomatic channel between China and Bhutan even though Bhutan does not have an embassy in Beijing. China will use its economic and connectivity clout in the same manner it has successfully snared Nepal.
External Debt in Bhutan averaged US$ 1300.04 million from 2003 until 2018. In 2019, the external debt of Bhutan rose to US$ 2.53 billion. The country’s unemployment rate rose to 5 percent in 2020 from 2.2 percent in 2019, which implies that of Bhutan’s some 7,71,608 population, about 38,580 are unemployed. China’s exports to Bhutan averaged US$ 948.71 from 2014 until 2021, reaching an all time high of US$ 7294 n January of 2021. Bhutan needs more investments to also create employment and China has deep pockets.
In recent years China has been calling for Bhutan’s active participation in Chinese projects even though Bhutan did not participate in the China’s BRI Forums in 2017 and 2019. But since Bhutan is looking for investments over just aid, China will likely pounce on the opening. India needs to promote investments in Bhutan by the private sector that also provides job avenues to Bhutanese, not remain focused solely on hydropower projects. There is also a definite need to carefully monitor Beijing’s machinations to promote anti-India currents in Bhutan. The sane world needs to caution China against attacking Bhutan and act if it does.