China’s Ballistic Missile Programme & Its Defence Industry

The ballistic missile capability that China had acquired was in evidence in the 1960s when it had deployed DF-1 (conventionally armed Short Range Ballistic Missile – SRBM), DF-2 (CCS-I Medium Range Ballistic Missile – MRBM) and tested DF-3 (CCS-III) in 1969. The Cultural Revolution, however, had caused a disruption to the strategic weapons programme. In the ‘70s, China had already developed MRBM, IRBM, ICBM capabilities.

It had deployed the DF-3 missiles and carried out successful testing of a limited range of ICBM DF-4 (CSS-4). By 1980, China had overcome the slowdown in its nuclear and missile programme. It successfully tested a full range DF-5 (CCS-IV) ICBMs capable of hitting targets in the US and the USSR. During the test, the missile flew from Central China to the Western Pacific and was recovered by a naval task force.

The year 1981 also witnessed a major leap in China’s strategic weapons capability. In that year it launched three satellites (from a single booster), Xia class SSBN; and successfully tested the CSS-X, NX-4 submarine launched ballistic missile. By 1986, China possessed ICBMs, IRBMs, MRBMs, and a sea based strategic force of SSBN and air force bombers capable of delivering nuclear bombs but unlikely to penetrate sophisticated air defence of nuclear powers like the USSR and the USA.

In 1987, there were unconfirmed reports regarding China having developed and deployed tactical nuclear weapons. The PLA’s ballistic missile capability is an amalgamation of Soviet technology, US experience, and Chinese ingenuity.

Strategic Rocket Force (2nd Artillery)

To begin with, the primary role of the 2nd Artillery was to carry out limited nuclear retaliatory strikes in case of a nuclear initiative by an adversary. After the Gulf War in 1991, its role diversified to include conventional engagement against high value strategic targets. The 2nd Artillery has a strength of 90,000 personnel and its headquarter is located at Qinghe (north of Beijing) and it is commanded by a Lieutenant General.

Defence Industry

The Chinese Defence Industry was first modelled on the lines of the Soviet Union. Right from the inception of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Chinese leaders accorded overwhelming priority to the development of indigenous capabilities for meeting the country’s defence needs. It sought Soviet assistance, which was crucial and lavish, resulting in rapid strides till the ‘60s. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was restrained in providing the latest innovations and products, and what it passed on to China was behind by a generation or two. The defence industries set up by China were located in the interior of the country for reasons of survivability in case of aggression. Lack of infrastructure and environment in the interior areas inhibited the growth of these industries.

In 1956, a twelve-year plan for development of science and technology was ushered in and in the same year an Aviation Industry Committee was established, which was replaced by the Commission of Science and Technology for National Defence (COSTIND) in 1958. The most important restructuring during this period was in 1963 when the COSTIND was disbanded (resurrected in 1982) and its responsibilities were taken over by the General Office for Defence Industry (GODI – established 1961) under the leadership of Zhou En Lai. The GODI was also entrusted with the development of the Atom bomb and the Hydrogen bomb. This restructuring was an indication enough for China’s nuclear programme to have reached a critical stage. In 1964, China had carried out its first nuclear test.

Initially, all the defence industries came under the Heavy Industry Department. Subsequently, the Ministries of Machine Industry (MMI) were set up under the State Council. Each of these MMIs or MMBs were entrusted with specific military production disciplines and had their own scientific research institutes.

The important MMBs were:

In the early part of the 1960s, some 80,000 personnel were employed in various scientific research institutes. Defence Industry development received a major setback after the cessation of assistance from the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet advisors in 1960. The Defence Industries became totally stagnant during the period of the Cultural Revolution (1967-1976). Consequent to the initiation of the modernisation programme in China, the Machine Building Ministries were reorganised and many civilians were appointed to run them.

The 8th MMB (a bureau) was upgraded to the level of a ministry. In the ‘80s, Deng Xiaoping, the father of Chinese modernisation, cogently advocated the combining of civilian and military strength for the progress of the defence industry. Deng prevailed upon these industries to adopt two different orientations i.e. peacetime and wartime, in order to resuscitate their economic health as well as to contribute to the overall economic growth of the country.Accordingly, the GODI and the MMBs set up import-export companies, thus integrating industry with trade. The New Times Company set up by the GODI assumed the overall responsibility for import and export of military technology and equipment. The COSTIND established China Yanshan Science and Technology Corporation, the PLA General Logistics Department established China Xinxing Corporation.

The National Defence Science & Technology and Industry Commission (NDSTIC), which was the coordinating body for Defence, Science and Industry, established China Xinshidai Corporation. These corporations undertook to promote Chinese weapons and also seek technology transfer and co-production arrangements with Western defence companies. The other corporations floated by the various defence industries were:

In 1982, consequent to the institutional reform of ministries and commissions, the various MMBs underwent major changes. The MMB-6 was re-organised into the China State Shipbuilding Corporation. The other MMBs also established their own subsidiary corporation and assumed civilian names i.e.

By the mid-’80s, various defence industries were manufacturing a wide variety of goods for civilian use, which included motor vehicles, optical equipment, pharmaceuticals and medical instruments. In 1985, the Ministry of Ordnance Industry manufactured 5,000 motorcycles as well as 250,000 cameras, 450,000 bicycles and 100,000 refrigerators. During this period, the government transferred many military facilities such as airfields, ports, docks, railroads, depots, and warehouses to civilian control. In 1986 and 1987, many inland defence enterprises were relocated closer to transportation links or cities.

The Chinese Military Industrial Complex (CMIC) comprises industries under the State Council called ‘Defence Industries’ and those under the PLA called ‘Military Industries’. The ‘Defence Industries’ comprise nuclear industry, aerospace industry, aviation industry, shipbuilding industry, weapons industry and military electronics industry. There are nearly 2,000 enterprises.

Under the reforms announced in early 1998, the functions of the government were separated from those of enterprises. Most military industrial enterprises were involved in both military and commercial production in the interest of national economic growth. In the mid-‘90s, 70 per cent of the output of Ministry of Ordnance Industry and 80 per cent of shipbuilding and repair activities were in the non-military sector. The 1998 reforms also created a new COSTIND i.e. SCOSTIND (State Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence) and the General Armaments Department of the PLA. The head of the SCOSTIND is a member of the CMC and attends the Politburo meeting as a non-voting member. He serves as the link between the State Council and the CMC for coordinated R&D and production.

The SCOSTINDs responsibility towards the country’s defence industries includes policy and objective formulation, restructuring, development, disciplinary management regulations, quality control, international cooperation, and R&D. Besides, the development of enterprises is also the responsibility of SCOSTIND. As a part of the reforms, the top five defence and technology corporations were split into ten new enterprises. The creation or division of these corporations was engendered due to the need to bifurcate their civil and military activities. These enterprises are State Owned Enterprises (SOE) under the direct supervision of the State Council. These SOEs are:

There is intense competition among the defence industrial groups. These groups are responsible for their own profits and losses. The PLA general logistics department has begun to contract out a range of activities to civilian entities. Procurement decisions are being taken on the western model of public bidding and tendering. Reportedly, the Chinese Defence Industry broke even in 2001 after eight years of being in the red. The Chinese leaders have urged the Chinese Military Industrial Complex to leapfrog in technical advances to catch up with the West (barring USA and Russia) in one bound. A success story in this direction has been the development of the Long March Rocket, which has so far launched more than 25 satellites.

China is currently the fifth largest exporter of arms i.e. after US, Britain, France and Russia. Its annual arms export is valued at around US $ 500 million. Chinese arms exports are basically conventional and light weapons, which are mostly based on Russian (USSR) technology. Although Chinese arms and equipment are no match to the hi-tech capability of US defence systems, they offer value for money and come at friendship prices. This is an attractive proposition for developing countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and African countries.

Even Thailand, which is a staunch US ally, has procured several defence systems from China in recent years, including Jianghu-III class frigates, Type-69 tanks, and 23mm air defence system and munitions. Many analysts are of the opinion that the Chinese defence products in some areas may match those of the US by the year 2020.