Awakening to National Defence: Hope at Last?

Published on
Read : 15 min
Battle Management System Indian Army
Awakening to National Defence: Hope at Last? - © Indian Defence Review

Clausewitz had prophesized that it was mandatory for a nation’s political leadership to possess a fair understanding of the profession of arms. For the military institution to deliver commensurate to the resources committed to its war-worthiness, the Ministry has to free itself from abject dependency upon archaic procedures and misinformed pinioning. Truly, civilian control over the military institution is exercisable by the wisdom of elected representatives and not through bureaucratic interpretations. For the nation’s political leadership to be competent to do so, it is mandatory that a deeper understanding of war is fostered among them. Indeed, that understanding must be the first among the principles of political management of a nation’s military institution. And the initiative to foster that understanding among the polity at large has to be the Minister’s first priority.

“What makes military failures more significant is the effect that they can have on society; military mistakes have a way of proving permanent…”
Geoffrey Regan

Rainbow over the South Block?

It was just great after a long, long time to find the Government’s Defence portfolio being managed by two successive Ministers who took ‘national defence’ on their agenda. This is a sign of the present Government viewing the nation’s state of defence preparedness as a priority responsibility. Arguably, this turnaround from the placid, if not regressive policies of the past, is caused by intense sabre-rattling from the neighbourhood and as much by the Government’s refreshing ideals of economic-technical-employment uplifting keeping its electoral promises.

Admittedly, there have been some able political leaders to hold that portfolio since Independence. But steeped in domestic politics of the day and little else, these worthies had been unable to bring themselves to imbibe that strategic knowledge which could have led to astute political management of the military institution. Apparently, most Defence Ministers, in misplaced notions, saw the Ministry’s domain as a ‘constituency’ where group and class interests, bounded by the election cycle, have to be nurtured. That notion would be understandable; but for the fact that in the process, little effort was devoted to strengthen the foundation of national defence – the military institution. The nation’s military capability was thus deliberately capped at what least had to be done to make it a tad tedious for the two powerful, innately inimical and militarily aggressive neighbours, from disintegrating India. The absurdity of that policy was compounded when even that least level of military preparedness was derived according to the blinkered strategic understanding of policy-makers.

Even if the ‘Congress culture’ would demur, in terms of tangible attributes of defence preparedness, performance of successive Governments of the past has been abject. The fundamentals of national defence – namely technology, industry and infrastructure have stagnated over the seven decades of post-independence and except for two decades of attention accorded after the 1962 debacle, deficiencies in weaponry and equipment have lowered the state of our military capability to a half-cock. Thus, after the path-making stints of YB Chavan, Jagjivan Ram and to some extent, R Venkatraman and Lal Bahadur Shastri, ended, hope of a turnaround is rekindled after a long gap, on the rise of a rainbow over the South Block.

Two Ministers

Manohar Parrikar had been the first between the two to take responsibility in his own hands. Apparently, he appreciated the salience of national defence within the overall ambit of national security and tried to imbibe the right concepts and practices of ‘political management of military institution’. His scientific education showed when he tried to reorient his Ministry from its long-established practice of ‘managing by procedural jugglery’ to ‘management by strategic consciousness’. Many long-frozen weapons acquisition and infrastructure development schemes were set in motion. But it was too ambitious to expect him to have learnt all and done all that he had promised to do in his short incumbency before his party accorded priority to its provincial fiefdom. One suspects that political nonchalance and bureaucratic captivity, which continued to stymie cost-efficient management of national defence, made him peel off from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in frustration.

Manohar Parrikar has been succeeded by Nirmala Sitharaman who has shown her sincerity and grit in taking up the cudgels and by all indications, she is intent on doing what is needed to strengthen our national defence. She was quickly off the mark and is oriented to the right approach, as it is seen in her giving impetus to many of the frozen modernisation schemes and infusing vigour into a moribund defence industry. Not a mean charter by any reckoning that has caused her appointment to be hailed by the nation’s strategic community. Many experts have thus come forward to apprise the new Minister with their analyses of the debilities besetting the nation’s defence preparedness and the manner in which these need to be attended to. Such advisories are relevant, of course and as she steers the Ministry’s course, her full intellectual focus would be tested in examining, evaluating and initiating appropriate measures to revamp the nation’s military institution.

‘First Principles’ of Military Management

However, true success of the Ministry’s venture in nurturing the military institution’s role, structure and application at affordable costs to the exchequer, would be best assured if the Minister succeeds in distinguishing military affairs from ill-advised application of civil processes which end up choking rather than strengthening defence preparedness. And to do so, it would be mandatory to be single-mindedly guided by the age-old ‘first principles’ of military management. These ‘first’ or basic principles have been handed down over nearly three thousand years of experience in statecraft and are universally followed in letter and spirit, except in recklessness. The Minister and her Ministry know these principles, of course, though it is debatable if these are diligently put into practice.

Salience of the said first principles may be better appreciated if we begin with just two examples of callousness with which the sublime spirit of military management, which actually drives the military institution, has been mishandled in the past.

First, in responding to the much needed improvements in service conditions of the soldier including the sailor and the airman, the Ministry chose to ‘upgrade’ the ranks tenable in various military appointments, a practice in civil sectors, instead of simply raising the compensation packages to ‘par-plus’ and let the sanctified hierarchy of military command, control and accountability be. It then went on to extend the years of soldiers’ colour service rather than keeping the military as young as commensurate to their skills, experience and military efficiency. Sacrosanct principles of military command, control and youth profile were thus fiddled with. No doubt, there were noble intents behind such steps, but it was clear that better via-media of implementing these intents had been blocked by misplaced inclinations of policy makers. Resultantly, the military organisation was turned dangerously top heavy, less agile, less innovative – all to the nation’s loss!

Second, in upgrading the career prospects of its civilian cadres, a powerful constituency no less, the Government landed up undermining the ever-silent soldiery’s status! Furthermore, the Ministry diluted the military’s lien upon the civilian defence-dedicated sectors – defence research and ordnance factories – only to encourage the latter’s unproductive autonomy. The result is there to see – India’s national defence is under siege; it survives on military hardware imported and trickle-produced.

Thus, by trying to manage it according to civil measures, many of the past Defence Ministers have actually ended up debilitating the noble military institution. It might, therefore, be useful if the sublimities of these first principles are reiterated, for the Government, the Ministry and even the new generation military leadership, to take note.

Principle 1: Understanding War

Clausewitz had prophesized that it was mandatory for a nation’s political leadership to possess a fair understanding of the profession of arms. For the military institution to deliver commensurate to the resources committed to its war-worthiness, the Ministry has to free itself from abject dependency upon archaic procedures and misinformed pinioning. Truly, civilian control over the military institution is exercisable by the wisdom of elected representatives and not through bureaucratic interpretations. For the nation’s political leadership to be competent to do so, it is mandatory that a deeper understanding of war is fostered among them. Indeed, that understanding must be the first among the principles of political management of a nation’s military institution. And the initiative to foster that understanding among the polity at large has to be the Minister’s first priority.

True appreciation of that priority comes from a simple, but mostly unseen fact. India’s huge military establishment is not the creation of her Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals, but it is commensurate to her much prided great subcontinental landmass, massive population, lofty ambitions, powerful enemies and above all, political choices.

Principle 2: Honouring the State-Soldier Covenant

An understanding of war should naturally lead to the honouring of the eternal State-Soldier Covenant. When the obligations of courting hardship, destruction and death are so fundamental to warfare, the nation has to find extraordinary personnel, train, equip and prepare them to be the nation’s warriors. The dispensation of society-nation-state meets that need by picking and segregating a carefully selected part of itself to form a fraternity of soldiery – soldiers, sailors and airmen – and equip them with the best of war wherewithal, training and upkeep that the State can afford. By so doing, the State ensures that its soldiery is best equipped to, first, bring success in its wars and then, as far as possible, survive its deadly destructiveness. Furthermore, in return for the servicemen’s arduous commitment, the State makes exclusive provisions for them to be well looked after, in and after service, dedicating a full-fledged department to attend to that charter. Finally, the State celebrates its soldiery with embellishments of medals, awards, respect and exclusive constitutional, judicial and financial privileges.

In similar vein, it is the Ministry’s responsibility to refute motivated rumours and false insinuations that inimical forces, ‘liberated’ intellectuals and sometimes frivolous media, throw at the military institution. The insinuation of an attempted military coup in Delhi, conjured up lies of human rights violations and filing of FIRs against duty-bound soldiers are a few examples when the State’s responsibility to stand by its military institution has failed. Even if meant to embarrass the Government of the day, these falsifications shake the soldiery’s confidence upon the State they stake their life for. To clarify, retribution of actual wrongdoings is equally necessary to keep up the innate cultural sublimity of the military institution.

Appreciation of the hoary State-Soldier Covenant helps strengthen the soldiery’s spiritual contract with the State and makes them stake their body, mind and filial bindings to keep their part of the bargain – all to the benefit of the State and the society. The Minister, therefore, may do everything to uphold this Covenant and so save the soldiery from falling into a state of want in terms of war-wherewithal, fighting spirit and twilight times of life. And that must be the second principle for the Minister to pledge allegiance to. The soldiery cannot be denied the right weaponry to fight with just because some politicians and their cronies make money from defence purchases and it does not behoove the majesty of the Indian State to first deny them their entitlements and then go on with endless appeals and contrived delays when judiciary favours their cause.

Principle 3: Celebrating Sainik Dharma (Military Culture)

On its part and in fulfillment of its mandate ordained, the military institution is called up to throw its mind and body to the purpose of securing the objectives of warfare that the nation commits it to. Indeed, the primary instrument of warfare must be the soldiers, sailors and airmen who, suppressing their natural instincts and giving up their democratic rights, commit to extreme exactions of courage, honour and discipline in order to devote to their colours and motherland to accept deprivation, tame danger and court injury or death in the process. And to lead such extraordinary personnel, there have to be extraordinary leaders who must epitomise sacrifice, brain and brawn – a rare amalgamation of intellect, innovation and gumption, all wielded with youthful foolhardiness. Truly, it is that Sainik Dharma or the military culture which makes the soldiery to go to such extremes when duty takes precedence over life and limb; honour becomes preferable to death; hopeless battles are fought regardless and danger stands ignored in disaster relief. It is the military culture which instinctively draws soldiers towards deadly fire while other citizens find safety in fleeing away from it.

Military culture is to be imbibed by arduous training and motivation. The Minister, therefore, may not be impressed by the quasi-military pretentions of various other arms of the State – bureaucracy, technocracy, academic, police et al – to claim military culture and practices. All are equally important no doubt, but these cannot and need not pretend to be military in culture, training, experience and performance. Indeed, the trend of civilian claim over military privileges and concessions carries the danger of reciprocal expectations among the soldiery and its disastrous consequences in the battlefield. Nurturing the soldiery’s cultural exclusivity, therefore, must be the third principle for the Minister to propagate – for the nation’s good.

Follow us on Google NewsIndian Defense Review - Support us by adding us to your Google News favorites.

Leave a Comment