A lot has been written about Generals in the recent past. Not because of in-house introspection or internal check but because misdeeds were exposed in the Media. Lack of internal audit is a cause for concern. I wish to draw attention not on morals, but on Professionalism.
I have never been able to understand why no one is concerned about professionalism of Generals, the most important battle winning factor. Is it lack of interest or is the importance just not realised? Due to inaccuracies in the recording of past wars and inadequate professional analysis, we fail to draw lessons from our conflicts, with the result Generalship continues to be most mediocre, barring a few exceptions.
Generalship is not mere planning and issue of orders. Generals must ensure optimum utilisation of available resources, achieve their aims at minimum cost, and deal with unforeseen challenges and adversities, which are inevitable.
An accurate indicator of the state of generalship in any Army is the performance of Generals during war. In India, War Performance of Generals has not been inspiring, with a few exceptions. Of course, we have won most wars but all on account of leadership at middle and lower levels, and weaknesses of the adversary. Even in our most successful campaign to liberate Bangladesh there were many opportunities missed. Personal accounts of various participants indicate there is more than what is commonly declared. What is disturbing is the propensity to colour History for glorification either of individuals or of the Army.
Generalship is not mere planning and issue of orders. Generals must ensure optimum utilisation of available resources, achieve their aims at minimum cost, and deal with unforeseen challenges and adversities, which are inevitable. At Command level skill lies in conducting Defence with minimum forces and generating maximum force for offensive operations even when conducting strategic defence. At Corps and Division levels the generals must utilize all their resources optimally to accomplish their missions. The plans, both in defence and attack must show some originality if not brilliance.
Generals must inspire confidence, be prepared to lead by example, and support their subordinates when needed. In case of adversity they must take their share of blame instead of finding scapegoats.
Except for a few Generals there are few other names that shine. Critical study of our own campaigns since 1947 indicates failure to utilise our resources optimally, in any war, and plenty of opportunities that were missed. No comments are offered on peacetime generalship which must be examined separately. A quick analysis of our past wars will throw light on the proficiency of our Generals in war.
Operations in J&K in 1947 – 48
At the time of Independence there were only six Indian brigadiers, of which one went to Pakistan. Therefore the rapidly promoted generals must be excused for drawbacks in operations and appreciated for what they achieved. Yet for the sake of learning lessons, a critical analysis is essential.
Even after the fall of Dras and Kargil, in May 48, Zojila Pass was not occupied despite there being a Corps Commander in J&K and an Indian Army Commander in Western Command, by then.
Our initial reaction to induct troops into J&K was magnificent, both into the Kashmir Valley and into the Jammu Region. However after the battle of Shalateng, instead of reinforcing 161 Brigade advancing to Uri, we withdrew a battalion from 161Brigade to place it under 50 Para Brigade at Jammu.
At a time when it was critical to induct more troops into the Valley across Banihal Pass, can we believe the Indian Army de-inducted a Battalion from the Valley, just to place it under another formation, within a fortnight of induction into the Valley?
Not that there was anything great about this battalion.It was this battalion, 1/2 PUNJAB, that withdrew from Jhangar in December 1947 without putting up a fightagainst tribals, abandoning even its MAHAR machine gunners. The Commander was Brig Md Usman.
With a battalion withdrawn, the newly raised 161 Brigade’s advance to Uri was affected. The dilemma to save Poonch or to advance to Muzzaffarabad thereafter is part of History. Even after the successful reinforcement of Poonch, and the Brigade falling back to Uri in November 47, no effort was made to advance either to Muzzaffarabad or to Haji Pir till May 48 by when Pakistan regular army had been deployed in J&K. Even the air base at Srinagar was withdrawn for the first winter.
Having driven the raiders out of the Kashmir no effort was made to occupy passes around the Valley such as Tut Mari Gali, Nastachun, Razdan, Zojila or Burzil. Even after the fall of Dras and Kargil, in May 48, Zojila Pass was not occupied despite there being a Corps Commander in J&K and an Indian Army Commander in Western Command, by then. Somehow the importance of passes was not realised.
...no one talks of the Indian Army giving up Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi which are west of Haji Pir on the Pir Panjal Range, in 1948. So how do we learn lessons from past mistakes?
During the entire campaign no thought was given to recapture Gilgit and the Northern areas. The task was not even mentioned in the directions given by the new Army Commander in January 1948. The besieged garrison at Skardu was last supplied in February 48 and then left to fight to the last and surrender to the barbarians in August.
Even though a company had been sent to Leh in February 48, and another one air lifted in May, after the fall of Kargil and Dras, CO 2/8 GR was airlifted to Leh only after the fall of Skardu in August, to coordinate the defence of Leh. Amazing! Why not in June?
South of Pir Panjal, four brigades remained in the sector throughout the year but Poonch was relieved only by November 48, even though a relief column had got through to the garrison in the summer to bring out 1 PARA from Poonch. In the sector Brig Md Usman’s achievements are played up whereas no one hears about Brig Yadunath Singh, Commander 19 Infantry Brigade, who not only relieved Rajauri, Thanamandi in April but also advanced to Poonch in the summer and later opened the routes to Poonch in November. Why?
May be because Brig Usman was killed by a chance artillery shell at his command post in Jhangar in July 48. While there is no harm in appreciating anyone particularly those killed in war, there is need to record our History accurately and shun professional dishonesty to fabricate glory.
Though many veterans criticise the Government for giving back Hajipir to Pakistan after 1965, no one talks of the Indian Army giving up Ledi Gali and Pir Kanthi which are west of Haji Pir on the Pir Panjal Range, in 1948. So how do we learn lessons from past mistakes?
As stated earlier the amateur handling of forces should be overlooked on account of lack of experience of the newly promoted generals.
Sino Indian Conflict 1962
The 1962 War is full of lessons. It is the first and last time that senior leadership was criticised, more to keep the heat off the other culprits. However it is important to note no one bothered to visit Aksai Chin after 1947, by land or even by air. Our management of the border with Tibet and China could not have been worse.
Indo – Pak Wars of 1965 and 1971
The 1965 war was thrust upon us but not 1971 which was conducted at the time of our choosing. Since it led to a spectacular victory in the liberation of Bangladesh the shortcomings in senior leadership are conveniently glossed over, to preserve the sheen of Victory!
At Fazilka, troops were employed but the armour failed to provide proper support leading to failure of counter attacks and avoidable casualties.
For example, the Indian Army could not recapture any position lost during any War, whether it was at Chhamb, Husainiwala, or Fazilka, even though there were adequate forces available at each of these places.
At Khemkaran in 1965, it was a controversial decision to try and recapture lost area by use of 4 SIKH, an excellent Battalion that had just captured Burki. A complete brigade with armour was available but the Army Commander, from the same Regiment, chose 4 SIKH to attack the Pakistanis west of Khem Karan, leading to many soldiers killed and taken prisoner. No action was taken by the Army Commander or anyone else thereafter.
In 1971 Husainiwala, lost on the first day, was not recaptured despite the adjacent Sehjra Bulge being captured by a brigade and another infantry brigade being available nearby, uncommitted. We could have easily recaptured Husainiwala from the North, had someone desired.
At Fazilka, troops were employed but the armour failed to provide proper support leading to failure of counter attacks and avoidable casualties.
When 3 JAT crossed Ichhogil Canal in 1965 to threaten Lahore, the battalion was called back since armour could not link up.
The sluggish and limited advance of 1 Corps into the Shakargarh Bulge is well known, in both wars.