With the Trump administration’s reluctant acceptance of the Iran Nuclear Deal, the spotlight is back on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions. Riyadh is vociferously against the deal that seeks to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons and places additional safeguards on its civilian nuclear power plants. This should raise suspicion among the global nuclear proliferation community over a possible Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation. Pakistan already has a reputation for proliferating nuclear designs and equipment to anybody with the ambition and monies to buy it.
The Trump administration recently notified the U.S. Congress that Iran is complying with the nuclear deal. He, however, ordered a review by a U.S. agency led by the National Security Council to evaluate whether the deal is vital to the national security interests of the United States. This indicates that though Trump is wary of Iran and willing to exert pressure, he has come to accept that Iran is keeping its side of the bargain in compliance with the deal.
This deal has divided the region with many of Iran’s neighbours showing no trust in Iran’s assurances that it does not seek to build nuclear weapons. Iran’s archrival, Saudi Arabia, arguably has a lot to lose from the deal. Riyadh argues that the deal only delays Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons by 10 years. On the other hand, lifting of sanctions could also mean Iran can eventually embed itself into the international market and, a few years down the line may even be able to mount a more forceful opposition to Saudi’s hegemony over West Asia.
The deal has exacerbated Saudi Arabia’s concerns and it could well seek nuclear weapons capability to match the threat posed by Iran once the major limitations of the deal end in 10 years--or much sooner in case the deal fails. Since currently Saudi Arabia has little nuclear infrastructure of its own, it could rely on its close ally, Pakistan, that has a history of proliferating nuclear technology and equipment to Libya, North Korea, and--ironically--Iran. Suspicion is also attached that the A.Q Khan-led nuclear bazaar had customers in Syria, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia.
Such close nuclear cooperation should not surprise anyone since Saudi Arabia virtually bankrolled Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. In fact, the then Saudi Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan, along with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif toured the Kahuta Research Laboratories in 1998 where Abdul Qadeer Khan (father of Pakistan’s nuclear program) briefed the Prince and Prime Minister Sharif on nuclear physics and sensitive issues involving nuclear explosive devices.
In August 2016, Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman visited Islamabad and met with Pakistan’s Defense Minister to strengthen defence ties. Although it is not known if Mohamed bin Salman and Pakistani officials discussed nuclear cooperation, the Crown Prince may have sought to renew closer nuclear relations with a nuclear-armed partner due to Saudi Arabia’s concern over Iran’s pursuit of atomic weapons.
While providing nuclear warheads will raise suspicions quite easily, Pakistan may choose to share sensitive fuel cycle capabilities, enrichment and reprocessing know-how that can help Saudis--who already possess limited civil nuclear facilities with plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors by 2030--reach the weapons threshold. The Saudis also have untapped sources of uranium sufficient for a clandestine nuclear program.
Secondly, Pakistan may assist Saudi Arabia by cooperating on sensitive nuclear technologies within Pakistan which Riyadh can use in case regional tensions further deteriorate. The paranoid Saudis may well be financing or may finance at a later stage, a uranium enrichment facility in Pakistan capable of building nuclear warheads that they can mount on the Dongfeng series of missiles they purchased from China in the 1980s, 2007 and then in 2014.
In case Pakistan chooses to be party to Riyadh’s nuclear ambitions, it would permanently jeopardise its relations with its neighbour, Iran. However, there are reasons to believe that this may not necessarily stop Pakistan. Relations between Iran and Pakistan have soured with the former accusing Pakistan of harbouring Sunni terrorists that have launched attacks inside Iran. In 2014, dozens of Iranian border guards entered Pakistan to counter militants and raided a village in Chagai village near the border. This even resulted in the death of a Pakistani paramilitary officer.
Iran accuses Saudi Arabia of funding Jaish ul-Adl, a Sunni terrorist group based in the eastern Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchestan and the western Pakistani province of Balochistan. It also accuses Pakistan of turning a blind eye to them. Jaish ul-Adl has been periodically killing Iranian border guards with the latest incident in April 2017 when 10 Iranian border guards were killed by the terrorists. Following the incident, Iran has been firing mortar shells inside Pakistan and warning Islamabad that it will target terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan.
Pakistan is also a member of a 41-nation “Islamic Military Alliance” that seeks to fight terrorism. The recently retired COAS (Chief of Army Staff) of the Pakistani Army, Raheel Sharif, will be leading the military alliance. Notably, all of these 41 countries are a Sunni majority and has earned criticism for being sectarian and directed towards Iran.
The efforts to acquire nuclear weapons technology will increase as the Iran nuclear deal reaches its final leg in 10 years. The international community has long tolerated Pakistan’s nuclear machinations that have further bolstered its ambitions. This time, however, the stakes are high. For the global non-proliferation community, all eyes should be on potential nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia lest the whole of West Asia is engulfed in a deadly nuclear arms race.